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I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION SOCIETY

After the Battle of the Forms:
Commercial Contracting in the Electronic Age
FRANCIS J. MOOTZ III *
Abstract: Commercial parties continue to fight the battle of the
forms, but electronic contracting is quickly rendering this practice
obsolete. In this article I assess the legal landscape for commercial
parties after the battle of the forms. In Section I, I briefly describe the
(relatively) settled law under U.C.C. § 2-207. I then describe how
these rules permit commercial parties to erect a force-field to protect
themselves from being subjected to unwanted terms, and the
developments in web-based contracting and recent case law applying
contract formation principles to electronic contracting. Finally, I
discuss how the growth of electronic contracting will eliminate the
battle of the forms that triggers the application of U.C.C. § 2-207, and
also will make it difficult for commercial parties to replicate the forcefield protection to which they have grown accustomed.

* William S. Boyd Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada,
Las Vegas, jay.mootz@unlv.edu. This article grew out of a presentation at the ABA Section
of Business Law Spring Meeting in Washington, D.C., on March 16, 2007. An earlier
version of this article was presented to the faculty of the William S. Boyd School of Law of
UNLV in January 2008 and at the Fourth Annual International Conference on Contracts at
the McGeorge School of Law at the University of the Pacific in February 2008. My thanks
to those who attended one of these events and offered challenges, questions and support. I
also gratefully acknowledge the excellent research assistance and careful proofreading
provided by Seth Zimmerman, a member of the Penn State Dickinson School of Law Class
of 2007 and a cheerful survivor of my Sales class. Caren Senter, Beth Cook and Jennifer
Stull (a member of the Penn State Dickinson School of Law Class of 2008) were careful
readers as I finalized this draft. Dave Frisch, Eric Gouvin, Mark Lemley, Michael Madison,
Juliet Moringiello, and Keith Rowley made helpful suggestions about how I might clarify
my argument. Finally, the anonymous peer reviewer for the I/S Journal offered very
helpful suggestions for improving the article.
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In Section II, I discuss the two primary doctrinal options available
to address contracting realities for commercial parties once the
electronic age of contracting has eliminated the battle of the forms.
The debacle surrounding Revised Article 2 suggests that the only
plausible response, as the theater of operations shifts from the battle
of the forms to the world of electronic contracting, will be judicial
rather than legislative. Although unconscionability analysis might be
a plausible doctrine to address egregious cases, I conclude that the
doctrine is too closely aligned with consumer protection to make it a
viable theory for commercial parties.
Instead, I argue that
rehabilitating the doctrine of reasonable expectations holds the most
promise for addressing the commercial contracting world after the
battle of the forms. This approach enjoys the benefit of being
grounded in Karl Llewellyn’s theory of the validity of standard form
contracts, is consonant with one of the important guiding principles of
Article 2, and will be sufficiently defined by the commercial context to
permit consistent application by courts policing the margins of
acceptable contracting practices.
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I know of few “private” law problems which remotely rival
the importance, economic, governmental, or “law”-legal, of
the form-pad agreement; and I know of none which has been
either more disturbing to life or more baffling to lawyers.
Karl Llewellyn 1

I. INTRODUCTION
Commercial parties continue to fight the “battle of the forms” by
exchanging documents that do not mirror each other as their mode of
contracting. 2 The number of cases that raise questions under U.C.C.
§ 2-207 may be small compared to the number that arose thirty years
ago, but this decrease undoubtedly is explained in part by the

1

KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 362 (1960).

Recent cases that address classic “battle of the forms” issues arising out of the exchange of
form documents during the contracting process are: Corestar Int’l Pte. Ltd. v. LPB
Comm’n, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.N.J. 2007); Smith & Loveless, Inc. v. Caicos Corp.,
471 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (D. Kan. 2007); Stemcor USA, Inc. v. Trident Steel Corp., 471 F.
Supp. 2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Deere & Co. v. Ohio Gear, 462 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2006);
Nartron Corp. v. Tuthill Corp., No. 05-70323, 2006 WL 1494992 (E.D. Mich. May 25,
2006); Gen. Steel Corp. v. Collins, 196 S.W.3d 18 (Ky. App. 2006); Converting/Biophile
Labs. v. Ludlow Composites Corp., No. 2005AP1628, 2006 WL 626308 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar.
15, 2006); Chainworks, Inc. v. Webco Indus., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-135, 2006 WL 461251
(W.D. Mich. Feb. 24, 2006); Plastech Engineered Prods. v. Grand Haven Plastics, Inc., No.
252532, 2005 WL 736519 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2005); Nw. Aluminum Co. v. Hydro
Aluminum Deutschland GmbH, No. Civ. 02-398-JE, 2003 WL 23571744 (D. Or. Sept. 23,
2003); Flender Corp. v. Tippins Int’l, Inc., 830 A.2d 1279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); AgGrow
Oils, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 999 (D.N.D. 2003); Aceros
Prefabricados, S.A. v. Tradearbed, Inc., 282 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2002); Elec. Techs. Int’l,
L.L.C. v. Bennett Pump Co., No. 01-C-0553-C, 2002 WL 32349389 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 15,
2002); Richardson v. Union Carbide Indus. Gases, Inc., 790 A.2d 962 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2002).

2

Of course, § 2-207 is also triggered when there is only a single form document that is
submitted in response to an order or an oral agreement. Recent cases include: Scotwood
Indus. Inc. v. Frank Miller & Sons, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (D. Kan. 2006); Posh Pooch
Inc. v. Nieri Argenti s.a.s., No. 106419/2005, 2006 WL 435808 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 23,
2006); Hansen-Rice, Inc. v. Celotex Corp., 414 F. Supp. 2d 970 (D. Idaho 2006); In re
Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 585 (M.D.N.C. 2005); S. Ill. Riverboat Casino
Cruises, Inc. v. Triangle Insulation & Sheet Metal Co., 302 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2002). Some
courts have erred by concluding otherwise in direct contravention of the statute. See, e.g.,
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Our case has only one form;
UCC § 2-207 is irrelevant.”).
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successful effort by courts to clean up the worst features of the
statutory mayhem known as § 2-207. As the judicially-massaged rules
of § 2-207 came into sharper focus, it stands to reason that litigation
would decrease.
In light of the tremendous expansion of the Internet’s commercial
role, the relative quiet on the “battle of the forms” front might be
explained by another reason. Commercial parties have increasingly
stopped exchanging forms as their mode of contracting or as their
method for confirming an agreement; they choose instead to place and
receive orders through web applications. In this new environment,
the battle of the forms may be irrelevant to commercial transactions.
This article will assess the legal landscape for those commercial
parties that have stopped fighting the battle of the forms.
In Section II, I argue that the battle of the forms between
commercial parties may become a relic of the twentieth century. First,
I provide a very brief overview of the (relatively) settled law under
§ 2-207. I emphasize that the significant practical effect of § 2-207 is
not only to permit commercial parties to erect a “force-field” to
protect themselves from being subjected to unwanted terms on the
other party’s form, but also to validate both parties’ forms to some
extent, even when they are not effective, in themselves, to create
contractual liability. Next, I describe developments in web-based
contracting and recent case law that applies contract formation
principles to electronic contracting. I conclude by suggesting that
click-wrap agreements could eliminate the battle of the forms and
thereby undermine § 2-207’s important role. Finally, I describe why
the efforts by parties to obtain the “force-field” protections of § 2-207
in this new contracting environment are unlikely to succeed.
In Section III, I discuss the primary doctrinal alternatives
available to address the contracting realities that commercial parties
will face if the electronic age of contracting eliminates the battle of the
forms.
First, I consider whether courts might use an
unconscionability analysis to protect commercial parties from
overreaching. Although plausible in egregious cases, the practice of
limiting the unconscionability doctrine to protecting consumers is so
ingrained that a general application of the doctrine in the commercial
setting is very unlikely. Instead, I suggest that rehabilitating the
doctrine of reasonable expectations can best address the problems
created by electronic contracting. This approach enjoys the benefit of
being grounded in Karl Llewellyn’s theory of the validity of standard
form contracts, and it is one of the important guiding principles of
Article 2. My approach to reasonable expectations will be sufficiently
defined by the commercial context to permit consistent application by
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those courts who are called upon to police the margins of acceptable
contracting practices.
I conclude that the advent of paper standard form contracts posed
problems for the law of contracts which § 2-207 has effectively
addressed in a manner that promotes the reasonable expectations of
the commercial parties involved. As contracting practices move away
from the battle of paper forms, and therefore outside the scope of § 2207, courts will need to protect commercial parties’ reasonable
expectations more directly.

II. THE END OF THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS
A. THE (NEARLY) SETTLED LAW UNDER
§ 2-207 FOR THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS
The commercial reality that motivated Karl Llewellyn to draft
§ 2-207 is well known: businesses generally contract by reaching
agreement only as to the key, material terms of a deal 3 ; they then
exchange form documents to show that they are closing the deal. 4
Although § 2-207 is universally derided for its incoherence, judicial
decisions have created a relatively stable body of law that successfully
abandons the common law “mirror image rule” by holding that the
mere fact that parties exchange documents that differ from each other
(even in material ways) does not prevent those documents from
creating a contract if the parties have so intended. Determining the
terms of the resulting contract is a bit trickier, but courts generally
have applied a “knockout” rule to terms that conflict, 5 and they follow
Generally, parties will agree expressly to a description of the goods, the price, and the
delivery terms, although they need not reach even this degree of specificity in order to have
an enforceable agreement under Article 2. See U.C.C. § 2-204.

3

A sales contract may be made “in any manner sufficient to show agreement.” U.C.C.
§ 2-204(1) (2000). However, a sales contract “does not fail for indefiniteness” even
though the parties have failed to show agreement on all the terms, so long as they have
shown that they intend to be bound and have agreed to enough terms to permit a court to
award a remedy for breach. Id. § 2-204(3).

4

The courts have developed an approach to deal with conflicting terms in the forms used
by parties to create the contract, analogizing to the “knockout” rule of U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 6
(2000), regarding confirmatory memoranda. See, e.g., Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741
F.2d 1569, 1578–80 (10th Cir. 1984) (describing the various interpretive approaches
available to courts); Flender Corp. v. Tippins Int’l. Inc., 830 A.2d 1279, 1285–87 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2003) (noting the strong support for the knockout rule and endorsing Daitom’s
prediction regarding how Pennsylvania would construe § 2-207).

5
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the rule of § 2-207(2) for terms that are additional to the terms on the
other form. Although there was a great deal of hermeneutical angst
leading to the settled reading of the statute, the end result is relatively
straightforward. The parties’ forms can create a contract, despite the
lack of symmetry that would demonstrate complete assent. The terms
of the resulting agreement include those terms as to which there is
demonstrated assent, together with terms that could reasonably be
expected to govern the relationship (consisting of immaterial
additions on either party’s form, and the statutory gap-fillers).
Section 2-207, as originally drafted, did not comprehensively
address the battle of the forms. The drafters recognized that it would
be stretching the idea of assent to conclude that a document could
operate as an acceptance even though it “expressly” made acceptance
“conditional on assent to the different or additional terms” in the
form. 6 In 1966, § 2-207 was amended by adding subsection (3) and
6 U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (2000). Put simply, this provision permits a party to use a document to
make a counter-offer in response to a document received from the other party, and is,
therefore, unexceptional and necessary. Formalist courts tend to enforce boilerplate
declarations, in which the party sending the second form proclaims that its assent is
“expressly conditioned” on the other party’s acceptance of its terms. See, e.g., C. Itoh &
Co., Inc. v. Jordan Int’l Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1235–36 (7th Cir. 1977) (boilerplate tracking
the “expressly conditional” language of § 2-207 is effective to prevent assent). However,
even if the forms do not establish assent, the courts agree that § 2-207 does not permit the
party sending the second form to obtain its terms; instead, recourse must be had to
§ 2-207(3) in those cases where conduct makes clear the agreement of the parties. Id. at
1236. The terms of the contract are those on which the forms of the parties agree, as well
as all other terms imposed by Article 2. Courts have construed these terms as including
agreement by course of performance, course of dealing and trade usage, in addition to the
gap-filler provisions. See Dresser Indus. v. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442, 1451–52 (7th Cir.
1992) (extending the rule announced in Itoh). Subsection (3) thereby ensures the
enforcement of the reasonable expectations of the parties when their conduct establishes
that they have an agreement, despite the failure of their writings to do so.

The better approach to the question of whether the second form constitutes a true counteroffer is adopted by the court in Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1168 (6th
Cir. 1972), in which the court held:
[I]t is not enough that an acceptance is expressly conditional on
additional or different terms; rather, an acceptance must be expressly
conditional on the offeror's assent to those terms. Viewing the
Subsection (1) proviso within the context of the rest of that Subsection
and within the policies of Section 2-207 itself, we believe that it was
intended to apply only to an acceptance which clearly reveals that the
offeree is unwilling to proceed with the transaction unless he is assured
of the offeror's assent to the additional or different terms therein.
Id. This reading of § 2-207(1) attempts to distinguish boilerplate language that does not
accurately reflect the unwillingness of the party to be bound from language in a form that
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its related Official Comments. Under this provision, conduct by both
parties indicating the recognition of an agreement “is sufficient to
establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not
otherwise establish a contract.” 7 The provision then specifies the
means for determining the terms of such an agreement. As under § 2207(2), the terms of the agreement under § 2-207(3) are determined
by the reasonable expectations of the parties, and include the “terms
on which the writings of the parties agree,” together with any gapfilling provisions. Thus, the forms that are exchanged do not lose
their significance even if they are insufficient on their face to close the
deal. However, by withholding assent in the form documents, the
parties lose the opportunity for differing nonmaterial terms in their
respective forms to become part of the agreement.
Although Karl Llewellyn clearly intended to overcome the “mirror
image rule” and the “last shot rule” that dominated the unrealistic
formalism of the classical common law model of contract, the practical
benefit of § 2-207 provides commercial parties with an affirmative
contracting strategy.
The section ensures that reasonable
expectations are respected, even when the parties do not expressly
agree on many terms of the deal.
Section 2-207 empowers
commercial parties by allowing them to avoid undesirable terms by
expressly states the party’s genuine and conscious refusal to proceed with a contract unless
its terms are accepted. The benefit of this approach is that it more closely tracks the
reasonable expectations of the parties by enforcing more terms from their battling forms
(not just terms in common, but also nonmaterial terms that do not appear in the other
form). This approach also acknowledges that the exchange by commercial parties of forms
that both proclaim to withhold assent unless the other party agrees to all of the terms in
the form is not worthy of judicial respect unless the party otherwise acts accordingly.
7 U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (2000). Comment 7 explains that in many cases, the conduct of the
parties makes clear that there is a contract, so the only matter to be resolved is specifying
the terms of their agreement. The fact that the exchange of forms did not in itself create
contractual liability is irrelevant to the formation question, since U.C.C. § 2-204(2) makes
clear that it is unnecessary to identify a distinct offer and acceptance to specify the moment
at which the parties became contractually bound. The statute makes clear that “conduct by
both parties” can show that a contract exists, and so this provision is not limited only to
those cases in which the parties have performed their obligations, despite the absence of
agreement. See Lam Research Corp. v. Dallas Semiconductor Corp., Nos. H027073,
H027366, H028003, 2006 WL 1000573 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2006) (seller had
constructed two of the six tools); Apex Oil Co. v. Vanguard Oil & Servs. Co., Inc., 760 F.2d
417 (2d Cir. 1985) (request by seller to extend delivery date and its buyer’s application to a
bank for financing the purchase was conduct sufficient to show agreement). Specifically, a
court may consider conduct prior to the exchange of boilerplate documents that ostensibly
withhold assent when determining whether an agreement exists. See Axelson, Inc. v.
McEvoy-Willis, 7 F.3d 1230, 1233 (5th Cir. 1993); Nat’l Controls, Inc. v. Commodore Bus.
Machines, Inc., 163 Cal. App. 3d 688, 693–94 (1985).
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creating a conflict with the other party’s form, resulting in the
enforcement of gap-filling terms under the “knock-out” rule. Forms
operate like a commercial law “force-field” in that a party can screen
out unwanted terms by raising its own form as a shield against the
other party. Thus, the party that does not want to arbitrate its
disputes will put a choice of forum term in its form.
If the other party does not respond with a “force-field” form of its
own, the choice of forum term will control. If the other party does
include a dispute resolution clause, the effects of the force-fields will
neutralize each other and the gap filler provision will provide the
enforceable dispute resolution term for the contract. Under Article 2,
the parties have an effective means to protect themselves against
terms that deviate from the reasonably expected gap-filling baseline in
material ways without having to worry that their non-mirroring forms
will interfere with the formation of an enforceable contract. This
monumental conceptual advance in the law of contracts has served
businesses well over the past forty years, despite the inelegant and
opaque presentation of § 2-207 and the resulting tidal wave of
litigation. 8
There is no need to wade deeper into the complexities of § 2-207
for the purpose of this article. Too much ink by scholars (not to
mention too much blood by litigators) has already been spilled in this
endeavor. The important point is that the courts, admittedly with
some missteps and confusion, acceptably resolved the problem of the
“battle of the forms” by respecting the reasonable expectations of the

As one court famously summarized, there is wide recognition that § 2-207 is not a model
of clarity and precision:

8

In reviewing this determination by the District Court, we are aware of
the problems which courts have had in interpreting Section 2-207. This
section of the UCC has been described as a “murky bit of prose,” Sw.
Eng’g Co. v. Martin Tractor Co., 205 Kan. 684, 694, 473 P.2d 18, 25
(1970), as “not too happily drafted,” Roto-Lith Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett &
Co., 297 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1962), and as “one of the most
important, subtle, and difficult in the entire Code, and well it may be
said that the product as it finally reads is not altogether satisfactory.”
DUESENBERG & KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE (Vol. 3, Bender's Uniform Commercial Code
Service) § 3.03, at 3–12 (1969). Despite the lack of clarity in its
language, Section 2-207 manifests definite objectives which are
significant in the present case.
Dorton, 453 F.2d at 1165.
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parties. 9 Unfortunately, courts have finally resolved how best to
implement § 2-207 just as its relevance to commercial contracting is
waning.

B. DEVELOPMENTS IN WEB-BASED CONTRACTING
AND THE EMERGING LEGAL REGIME
When a commercial party submits an order on a supplier’s
website, there would appear to be no battle of the forms, thus
rendering § 2-207 irrelevant to the transaction. Manufacturers are
developing increasingly sophisticated inventory control, production
management, and supply-chain integration, all of which require
computerized order management. Naturally, this leads sellers to
encourage online transactions through web applications because this
method eliminates the need for any data to be input by the seller. 10
The same dynamic holds true for many buyers as well: a large
manufacturer benefits if it purchases raw materials and component
parts by means of highly sophisticated software that invites approved
sellers to make offers on the buyer’s website, subject to the buyer’s
terms and conditions.
Web-based contracting enables the buyer to integrate its
purchasing needs with nearly simultaneous offers from designated
sellers. The fact that this contracting process also allows the buyer to
obtain its posted terms while avoiding the battle of the forms may just
The accumulated wisdom of decades of litigation generally has been gathered in Amended
Article 2 (2003), proposed by the Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”) [formerly known as
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”)], but
Amended Article 2 has been ignored by the states. Amended § 2-207 wisely separates
contract formation principles from § 2-207 and adds them to Amended § 2-206, and it
makes clear that the “knockout” rule applies generally. Unfortunately, Amended § 2-207
dodges the all-important question of “shrink-wrap” terms (see Amended Cmt. 5) and also
eliminates the sensible rule that additional terms in one form can enter the agreement if
they do not materially alter the agreement and the other party has not effectively protested
(either prospectively or after receiving the form with the additional term).

9

10 A personal (consumer) experience confirms how important these web applications may
be for contemporary businesses. I recently ordered a deluxe fruit basket for a relative over
the Internet, but, as soon as I completed the order, I realized that I had made a mistake
with regard to the delivery date. I immediately e-mailed and telephoned customer service,
advising them of the mistake. The customer service representative assured me that I would
not be charged for my original (incorrect) order, but also said that the company had no
effective means of canceling the order, even though the scheduled delivery date was nearly
two weeks away. Rather than interrupt the computerized fulfillment of the order, it made
more sense for the company to absorb the loss. So, my relative received two deluxe fruit
baskets for the price of one (and I received two thank-you notes).

280

I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

[Vol. 4:2

be a collateral benefit to the business advantages of contracting in this
manner. The advantages of computerized contracting are magnified
in many industries where large parties both purchase from, and sell
to, other commercial parties.
As companies further transition to web-based inventory control
and ordering, we will see fewer battles involving forms. Although it
might appear that avoiding the dreaded “battle of the forms” promises
to restore clarity and certainty to contract law, the resulting regime’s
prevailing doctrine may need some adjustments before it proves to be
acceptable to, and appropriate for, commercial parties. In this
Section, I first provide a brief historical overview of the legal analysis
of this emerging contracting reality before discussing desirable
changes in the application of contract law doctrines.
An initial step toward Internet contracting was the so-called
“shrink-wrap” cases where sellers concluded deals with respect to the
dickered terms and then delivered the goods to the buyer with
voluminous standard terms included inside the box. Without the
typical order-acknowledgement contracting, these cases generated a
great deal of controversy and uncertainty in the law. 11 This scenario

“Shrink-wrap” contracts posed difficulties for courts because the time of contracting,
ostensibly irrelevant under § 2-204(2), was subject to dispute and interpretation; here it
became vitally important in deciding whether the agreement included the terms contained
inside the (sometimes metaphorical) shrink-wrap. See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F.
Supp. 2d 1332, 1338 (D. Kan. 2000) (noting that the results in the cases turn, at least in
part, on “whether the court finds that the parties formed their contract before or after the
vendor communicated its terms to the purchaser”). In my Sales casebook, I have
characterized this mode of contracting as moving from the “battle of the forms” to the
“attack of a single form.” See FRANCIS J. MOOTZ III, DAVID FRISCH & PETER A. ALCES,
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTING: SALES, LEASES, AND COMPUTER INFORMATION 135 (LexisNexis
2004). Case law includes vigorous debate as to whether these scenarios implicate § 2-207.
Some courts have famously held that the parties had concluded their contracting before the
shrink-wrap terms were introduced, and, therefore, the terms must be assessed as
“additional” terms under § 2-207. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91
(3d Cir. 1991) (holding that an in-box license must be analyzed as additional terms under
§ 2-207, and finding that the shrink-wrap terms were not a counteroffer accepted by the
buyer but instead were additional terms that entered the agreement only if they were not
material); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Orris, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (D. Kan. 1998); Ariz. Retail
Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993); Wachter Mgmt. Co. v.
Dexter & Chaney, Inc., 144 P.3d 747 (Kan. 2006); Lively v. IJAM, Inc., 114 P.3d 487 (Okla.
App. 2005); and Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 389 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 2001). Other
courts have concluded that the agreement was not formed until the terms in the box arrive;
therefore, the shrink-wrap terms become part of the contract through the recipient’s
manifestation of assent by keeping the goods. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d
1147 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); M.A.
Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000) (en banc). For a
particularly detailed critique of “terms later” contracting as recognized in ProCD and Hill,
11
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quickly moved beyond the literal case of documents located within a
shrink-wrapped box to situations in which an order was placed (by
telephone or on a website) and the terms were made available to the
customer at a later point, leading commentators to characterize this
method of forming the contract as ongoing or “rolling.” 12 Courts were
divided about how to assess this new contracting environment. While
most courts were wary of adding terms to the deal in the absence of
manifest consumer assent, some courts began with the presumption
that the requirements of the modern economy made it necessary for
the law to move in precisely this direction. Fortunately, in the era of
web-based ordering, there simply is no need for sellers to use “terms
later” contracting that is subject to the inconsistent judicial treatment
of so-called “shrink-wrap” terms; the playing field has moved to a
more seller-friendly Internet venue.
A commercial buyer is likely to find Internet ordering every bit as
convenient as the millions of consumers who order from Amazon.com
and other online companies. 13 When a buyer submits an order on the
seller’s website, the seller is able to present its standard terms and
conditions (in the form of a hyperlink, or inside a text box that
contains the terms which may be read with a scroll bar) to the buyer
as part of the initial contract formation, rather than after the sale in
see Roger C. Bern, “Terms Later” Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad
Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. POL’Y 641 (2004).
See generally Steven E. Friedman, Improving the Rolling Contract, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1,
4–7 (2006) (characterizing “rolling contracts” as those in which at least some of the terms
are presented later, including, but not limited, to the classic shrink-wrap situation). For
example, in Williams v. Am. Online, Inc., No. 00-0962, 2001 WL 135825 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Feb. 8, 2001), a group of consumers brought a class action, complaining that damaging
configurations to their computers occurred during the downloading process and before the
terms of service were made available for the consumer to read and then click “I agree.”
This case is probably best viewed as a “shrink-wrap,” terms-to-follow case, despite the fact
that the product in some cases was downloaded from the Internet. The court noted that
the damage occurred before the terms were presented, and even then the consumer was
forced to change the default selection and click an alternate icon twice to get to the screen
that displayed the terms of service, which could, of course, be rejected only after the alleged
damage had occurred.

12

13 I could not locate data regarding the prevalence of online ordering by commercial
parties, but the volume of retail e-commerce is probably a useful proxy for the growing
importance of such ordering. According to the U.S. Census Bureau of the Department of
Commerce, the U.S. retail e-commerce sales estimate for the third quarter of 2007 is $36.2
billion. Although this represents only 3.5% of all retail sales, there is continuing strong
growth in e-commerce every quarter. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau,
Quarterly
E-Commerce
Sales,
4th
Quarter
2007
(Feb.
15,
2008),
http://www.census.gov/mrts/www/data/html/07Q4.html.
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the form of documents included with the goods. It was immediately
apparent to courts that this situation was different from the scenario
presented in the shrink-wrap cases. Courts began characterizing
transactions as “browse-wrap” agreements when the terms were
referenced on the website accessed by the buyer, and as “click-wrap”
agreements when the buyer was required to “accept” the terms
actively by clicking an “I agree” icon. 14
A number of courts refused to enforce terms that were offered in
browse-wrap fashion on the grounds that the parties had not agreed to
them because the terms were not sufficiently highlighted by the
offering party. 15 As one court explained, browse-wrap terms will not
enter the agreement if the party had visited a website only sporadically
and, therefore, was unaware of the terms and conditions that were
available, but not immediately presented, on the website. However, if
the evidence shows that the party had notice of the terms and
conditions referenced on the site, then that party will be bound by the
The analysis in these cases focused on the
posted terms. 16
14 Two commentators recently noted that this nomenclature does not correspond to
natural, fixed categories because some commercial situations will exhibit characteristics of
both scenarios. See Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, Survey of the Law of
Cyberspace: Electronic Contracting Cases 2005–2006, 62 BUS. LAW. 195, 201–03 (2006)
(discussing the irrelevance of the click-wrap/browse-wrap distinction as exhibited in
Hotels.com, L.P. v. Canales, 195 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006)). See also Juliet
Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1307 (2005)
(arguing that courts should assess cases in terms of the signaling function of the
communication methodology to reference the terms, rather than attempting to define
different categories of cases).

The classic case is Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). The
court concluded 1) that the persons seeking to download the SmartDownload program
would have no reason to scroll down the web page to find the link to the terms and
conditions, 2) that the link went to a generic page with a number of different license terms
for various products, and 3) that there was no “I agree” button that signaled the existence
of the terms and conditions. The court concluded: “We disagree with the proposition that a
reasonably prudent offeree in plaintiffs’ position would necessarily have known or learned
of the existence of the SmartDownload license agreement prior to acting, so that plaintiffs
may be held to have assented to that agreement with constructive notice of its terms.” Id.
at 30. The court noted that UCITA “generally recognizes the importance of conspicuous
notice and unambiguous manifestation of assent in online sales and licensing of computer
information,” showing that this effort by NCCUSL may be influential despite its failure as a
uniform law project. Id. at 34.

15

16 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401–02 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasizing the
ordinary contract principles at work by analogizing to a roadside fruit stand with a bushel
of apples and a sign that indicates they are for sale for 50 cents each). The court
specifically rejected the suggestion by other courts that clicking an “I agree” button was a
necessary element of showing one’s assent to the posted terms, concluding:
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conspicuous character of the posted terms of use, viewed in light of
the parties’ contracting history, the nature of the interactions between
the party to be bound, and the website in question. In general, if a
commercial party with some measure of sophistication sought to
avoid a reasonable term of use by claiming ignorance of the terms,
despite repeated visits to the website, courts have been reluctant to
permit that commercial party to avoid liability. 17
[W]e are not inclined to agree with the Ticketmaster court’s analysis.
There is a crucial difference between the circumstances of Specht,
where we declined to enforce Netscape’s specified terms against a user
of its software because of inadequate evidence that the user had seen
the terms when downloading the software, and those of Ticketmaster,
where the taker of information from Ticketmaster’s site knew full well
the terms on which the information was offered but was not offered an
icon marked, “I agree,” on which to click. Under the circumstances of
Ticketmaster, we see no reason why the enforceability of the offeror’s
terms should depend on whether the taker states (or clicks), “I agree.”
We recognize that contract offers on the Internet often require the
offeree to click on an “I agree” icon. And no doubt, in many
circumstances, such a statement of agreement by the offeree is essential
to the formation of a contract. But not in all circumstances. While new
commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many new situations, it
has not fundamentally changed the principles of contract. It is standard
contract doctrine that when a benefit is offered subject to stated
conditions, and the offeree makes a decision to take the benefit with
knowledge of the terms of the offer, the taking constitutes an
acceptance of the terms, which accordingly become binding on the
offeree. . . .
As we see it, the defendant in Ticketmaster and Verio in this case had a
similar choice. Each was offered access to information subject to terms
of which they were well aware. Their choice was either to accept the
offer of contract, taking the information subject to the terms of the
offer, or, if the terms were not acceptable, to decline to take the
benefits.
Id. at 403 (criticizing Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV99-7654, 2000 WL
1887522 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000)) (citations omitted).
17 See Register.com, 356 F.3d at 396–97 (upholding the browse-wrap agreement on the
terms of use and noting that Verio devised an automated software program, or robot, to
acquire information from Register.com’s site and then attempted to use that information
for its own commercial benefit in a manner that “was inconsistent with the terms of the
restrictive legend Register attached to its responses to Verio's queries”); Pollstar v.
Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 976 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (refusing to dismiss the
complaint for breach of contract against Gigmania, which downloaded up-to-date
information on concerts from Pollstar’s site and then posted this information on its own
site).
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In the fact-specific and uncertain legal environment surrounding
browse-wrap agreements, sellers quickly adapted by introducing clickwrap formats on their websites that both made clear the terms and
conditions that governed the transaction, and made these terms
immediately available to the party in a scrolling text box or via
hyperlink. 18 Pure click-wrap contracts have received very favorable
treatment by the courts under standard contract analysis. Courts have
readily concluded that clicking an “I agree” icon next to an electronic
presentation of the seller’s terms forms a contract and manifests the
purchaser’s assent to those terms. 19 Click-wrap cases are easy cases
Even in the consumer setting courts have enforced browse-wrap agreements in
circumstances where the party had more than cursory notice of the terms. See, e.g. Fiser v.
Dell Computer Corp., 165 P.3d 328, 334 (N.M. App. 2007) (holding that Fiser was bound
by terms that were available not only by a hyperlink during the ordering process, but also
were included with the delivery of the computer when Fiser still had the ability to cancel
the transaction).
The move to click-wrap contracting was a predictable response to the Specht case. For
example, in the aftermath of the District Court opinion in Specht, attorney David Scranton
suggested that his fellow banking lawyers ought to be advising their clients using website
interfaces to transition immediately to click-wrap contracting to ensure enforceability.

18

Even if other courts decide otherwise, this decision appears clear
enough that banks and other financial institutions should be promptly
reevaluating their Web sites to be sure that any terms, conditions or
agreements that are intended to be binding upon a visitor are
implemented with a “click-through” type mechanism to verify that the
visitor is aware of them and agrees to them. . . .
...
Thus, although the matter may not be finally resolved in many
jurisdictions, it clearly appears to be a unanimous trend of decisions to
uphold click-wrap agreements if they sufficiently give notice of an
agreement’s terms to a Web site visitor and require the visitor to
affirmatively indicate agreement by clicking a button, but to deny
enforceability to browsewrap or other agreements that require
something less of a visitor.
David F. Scranton, “Clickwrap” or “Browsewrap”: Enforceable Website Agreements, 119
BANKING L.J. 290, 291, 295 (2002). This advice has only been reinforced by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision affirming Specht and other case
law on these points.
19 One commentator recently concluded, “[b]ecause the user has ‘signed’ the contract by
clicking ‘I agree,’ every court to consider the issue has held clickwrap licenses enforceable.”
Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 466 (2006) (citing relevant cases in
note 20). Representative cases include: Specht, 306 F.3d at 22 (finding that the parties
“expressly agreed to Communicator’s license terms by clicking ‘Yes’”); Forrest v. Verizon
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because there is no ambiguity regarding the time of formation, as
there is in shrink-wrap cases; here, the terms are present when the
buyer manifests assent. Consequently, most courts find § 2-207

Commc’n, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010–11 (D.C. Ct. App. 2002) (consumers had notice and
opportunity to read the forum selection clause before clicking “I agree”); RealPage, Inc. v.
EPS, Inc., No. 4:06-CV-251, 2007 WL 2572255 (E.D. Tex., Sept. 5, 2007) (holding that
click-wrap terms are enforceable even if the party was not required to scroll through the
entire agreement before clicking “I accept,” but finding that the terms in question were too
indefinite to enforce); Doe v. Sexsearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio, 2007);
Hauenstein v. Softwrap Ltd., No. C07-0572MJP, 2007 WL 2404624 (W.D. Wash., Aug. 17,
2007); Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 238 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“By clicking on
the ‘Yes, I agree to the above terms and conditions’ button, Plaintiff indicated assent to the
terms . . . Plaintiff’s failure to read the Agreement, if that were the case, does not excuse
him from being bound by his express agreement.”); FTC v. Cleverlink Trading Ltd., No. 05
C 2889, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82264 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2006) (finding that clicking an
“Accept” box is analytically indistinguishable from traditional ways of showing assent, and
that there “is no dispute that Cleverlink [buyer] applied for Oceanic’s [seller] services over
the Internet and accepted the terms of the Agreement by clicking the “Accept” box”);
Eslworldwide.com, Inc. v. Interland, Inc., No. 06 CV 2503(LBS), 2006 WL 1716881
(S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2006) (forum selection clause enforceable although contained in the
terms of service agreement that the plaintiff allegedly inadvertently clicked when visiting
the site to update its credit card information on file); Siebert v. Amateur Athletic Union of
the U. S., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1039–40 (D. Minn. 2006) (finding that clicking the
icon is a manifestation of assent to the terms offered); i-Systems, Inc. v. Softwares, Inc.,
No. Civ. 02-1951 JRTFLN, 2004 WL 742082, *6 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2004) (click-through
process for loading 2001 software formed a contract); Koresko v. RealNetworks, Inc., 291
F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1162–63 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (finding that clicking the “I agree” icon
evidenced express agreement to the offeror’s terms); DeJohn v. TV Corp. Int’l, 245 F. Supp.
2d 913, 919 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“Although it is true that the terms of the contract were
dictated solely by Register.com, DeJohn expressly indicated that he read, understood, and
agreed to those terms when he clicked on the box on Register.com’s website.”); Hughes v.
McMenamon, 204 F. Supp. 2d 178, 181 (D. Mass. 2002) (forum selection clause in clickwrap agreement is enforceable); iLan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp.
2d 328, 338 (D. Mass. 2002) (finding explicit acceptance of terms by clicking on “I agree”);
In re RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341 (N.D. Ill., May 8,
2000); Forrest v. Verizon Commc’n, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010–11 (D.C. Ct. App. 2002)
(finding that consumers had notice and opportunity to read the forum selection clause
before clicking “I agree”); and Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 532 (N.J.
App. 1999) (“Plaintiffs must be taken to have known that they were entering into a contract
[by clicking “I agree”], and no good purpose, consonant with the dictates of reasonable
reliability in commerce, would be served by permitting them to disavow particular
provisions or the contracts as a whole.”).
In this article I assume that for all practical purposes, the battle regarding assent is over—
perhaps with good cause in light of Karl Llewellyn’s theory of blanket assent, see text and
accompanying notes 74–82 infra—and that the issue facing courts is how to determine the
governing terms of the agreement. Nevertheless, it is worth recalling that genuine assent is
anything but clear-cut in these cases.
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wholly irrelevant to the legal analysis, just as if the parties had signed
a single paper document memorializing their agreement. 20
Although the situation is not quite as clear-cut, courts reach the
same result for software that requires the licensee to click-through
several “I agree” icons in order to install the program. In these
situations, courts find either (1) that the agreement was not finalized
until the click-wrap stage during installation (the “rolling contract”
analysis), (2) that the click-wrap agreement during the installation
represents the buyer’s acceptance of the seller’s counteroffer, or (3)
that the click-wrap agreement is a modification of a pre-existing
agreement that led to the shipment of the product. The rules of
§ 2-207 are implicated only under the counteroffer analysis, and then
only to establish that the counteroffer was accepted by the licensee;
therefore, there is no traditional battle of the forms. 21

20 Salco Distribs. v. Icode, Inc., No. 8:05-CV-642-T-27TGW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9483
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2006). The Salco Court held that by signing a purchase order that
referenced an End User License and Servicing Agreement, opening the envelope containing
the software that contained a similar legend and then clicking several “I accept” icons in
the course of installing the software, the licensee was bound by the licensor’s forum
selection clause. The court followed the seemingly unanimous approach of courts that
specifically reject the application of § 2-207 in such cases, concluding that § 2-207

[A]ddresses the terms of a contract “when the parties’s [sic] conduct
establishes a contract, but the parties have failed to adopt expressly a
particular writing as the terms of their agreement, and the writings
exchanged by the parties do not agree. . . .” Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v.
Wyse Tech. 939 F.2d 91, 98 (3d Cir. 1991). Here, Plaintiff and
Defendant expressly adopted a particular writing as their Agreement.
As noted in ProCD, Inc., [v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)],
this is not “a battle-of-the forms case, in which the parties exchange
incompatible forms and a court must decide which prevails.” ProCD,
Inc., 86 F.3d at 1452. . . .
...
Plaintiff expressly accepted the terms of the Agreement by opening,
installing and registering the software and clicking “I accept.” Its terms
are therefore enforceable.
Id. at *11–14; see also Siebert, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 1039–40; Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet
Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (E.D. Mo. 2004); Koresko, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 1162–63.
21 iLan Sys., Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 338 (discussing the various ways in which the
agreement could be construed, but finding that even under § 2-207 the parties ultimately
agreed on additional terms by virtue of the click-wrap agreement embedded in the disks).
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Finally, there may be an intermediate shift in practices that also
would render the battle of the forms irrelevant. We might add to the
developed lexicon by recognizing an additional category of cases that
can be termed “sign-wrap” contracts. These cases present a variation
on the doctrine of incorporation by reference. The sign-wrap situation
occurs when parties execute a written agreement that includes a
notice that the terms of the agreement include standard terms that are
posted at a designated URL. Although the parties are dealing with a
paper contract, the referenced “standard terms and conditions” reside
only in cyberspace. 22 Unlike the traditional form contract that
presented the standard terms and conditions on the reverse side of the
document, the sign-wrap approach permits a party to obtain a
signature on a form that contains the agreed material terms and a
reference to a URL that purports to incorporate those standard terms
into the agreement, despite the other party’s potential ignorance of
their existence.
Compared to the browse-wrap scenario, there is a more specific
manifestation of assent because the party signs the form that includes
the URL reference. However, compared to the click-wrap scenario,
there is less explicit consent to the terms in question because there is
no specific assent to terms that are immediately available before
signing. It would appear that the intermediate strategy of sign-wrap
contracts will generate litigation and uncertainty. 23 Thus, it is likely
that this approach will be phased out in favor of a web-based “clickwrap” approach, to the extent possible.
22 Compare Hugger-Mugger, L.L.C. v. NetSuite, Inc., No. 2:04-CV-592 TC, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33003, at *15 (D. Utah Sept. 12, 2005) (finding that the terms were incorporated by
reference), with Affinity Internet, Inc. v. Consol. Credit Counseling Servs., 920 So. 2d 1286,
1288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that the mere reference to the website was
insufficient to incorporate the terms). These cases are analyzed in Moringiello & Reynolds,
supra note 14, at 199–200. But cf. Conference Am., Inc. v. Conexant Sys., Inc., 508 F.
Supp. 2d 1005 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (finding that a letter referencing terms at a URL
successfully incorporated the posted terms under unilateral contract analysis).

One significant problem might arise in determining the terms that were posted at the
URL at the time of contracting. Assuming that the party continually adjusts its terms, it
would stretch even a formalist approach to contract doctrine to conclude that the other
party had consented to permit the terms of the agreement to be modified at will simply by
changing the terms posted at the designated URL. If a party expressly attempts to subject
the other party to terms that may be changed at will, it seems difficult to understand how
the test of an “intent to be bound” would be met. Even if the contract is interpreted in this
manner, there would be a significant question of the bounds of a good faith exercise of this
right that would render the terms less predictable. A simple solution for sellers is to
change the URL with each iteration, perhaps by adding a code for the date of the update to
the link, but this would lead to a multitude of different contract forms that would
undermine the purpose of having a standard form agreement in the first place.
23
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The case law struggling with the contract analysis of shrink-wrap,
browse-wrap, sign-wrap and click-wrap agreements, has developed
largely as a result of litigation involving computer information
transactions. Although computer information transactions are not
expressly included within the scope of Article 2, courts often apply
Article 2 by analogy or by reading the scope provision broadly. 24 It
This is a huge and contentious issue. Article 2 applies to “transactions in goods,” U.C.C.
§ 2-102 (2000), with goods being defined as “all things . . . movable at the time of
identification to the contract for sale.” U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2000). Computer information is
licensed rather than sold, and it is more in the nature of intellectual property than a good.
A license can be considered a “transaction,” but it remains difficult to consider the
licensing of intellectual property to be a “good.” Moreover, the definition of “contract” and
“agreement” provide that they are “limited to those relating to the present or future sale of
goods.” Id. § 2-106(1), and most of the provisions in Article 2 refer expressly to buyers and
sellers. Nevertheless, many courts find that Article 2 provides appropriate rules governing
contract formation for these transactions. The court in iLan characterizes this approach in
an honest manner:
24

In Massachusetts and across most of the nation, software licenses exist
in a legislative void. Legal scholars, among them the Uniform
Commissioners on State Laws, have tried to fill that void, but their
efforts have not kept pace with the world of business. . . . So far only
Maryland and Virginia have adopted UCITA; Massachusetts has not.
Accordingly, the Court will not spend its time considering UCITA. At
the same time, the Court will not overlook Article 2 simply because its
provisions are imperfect in today’s world. Software licenses are entered
into every day, and business persons reasonably expect that some law
will govern them. For the time being, Article 2’s familiar provisions—
which are the inspiration for UCITA—better fulfill those expectations
than would the common law. Article 2 technically does not, and
certainly will not in the future, govern software licenses, but for the
time being the Court will assume it does.
iLan, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 332 (footnote omitted). There is a confusing array of cases on this
topic, including a recent case in which the court concluded that an agreement to develop
software from scratch is not within the scope of Article 2 because it is more in the nature of
a service contract, ignoring the fact that agreements to develop custom-designed and
specially manufactured goods are contracts within the scope of Article 2 pursuant to the
definition of “goods” in U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2000). See Syss. Am., Inc. v. Rockwell Software,
Inc., No. C 03-02232 JF (RS), 2007 WL 218242, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2007)
(unpublished slip opinion).
Courts rarely note the truly Llewellynesque character of Article 2’s scope provisions, which
are qualified with the caveat, “unless the context otherwise requires.” See U.C.C. §§ 2-102,
and 2-106(1) (2000). Consequently, Article 2 literally extends to all transactions to which
it makes sense to apply Article 2, thereby granting to courts the express statutory
justification for picking and choosing when Article 2 makes sense for a particular case
involving computer information. This is a bit radical, I suspect, for virtually any court to
embrace, but there you have it in black and white.
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stands to reason that this developing line of precedent from the
computer information arena will be applied to transactions in
traditional goods as producers and purchasers embrace the Internet
era of electronic contracting. 25 If so, commercial parties will have
every reason to respond to this evolving legal landscape by using clickwrap agreements to secure all of their desired terms in contracts
involving the sale of goods.
The problem with this development in contracting practices is that
there is every reason to believe that a formalist endorsement of clickwrap agreements will not capture the parties’ “bargain in fact” in some
cases. Writing about consumer transactions, scholars have argued
that transactions conducted over the Internet are qualitatively
different in certain respects from the use of paper standardized

A recent scholarly exchange between Professors Nimmer and Braucher about whether
Article 2 should govern information transactions suggests that the radioactive fallout from
the failed UCITA and Article 2 drafting projects has a durable half-life and that this issue
will continue to foster a vigorous scholarly debate. Compare Raymond T. Nimmer, An
Essay on Article 2's Irrelevance to Licensing Agreements, 40 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 235
(2006), with Jean Braucher, Contracting Out of Article 2 Using a “License” Label: A
Strategy that Should Not Work for Software Products, 40 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 261 (2006).
My general approach to this problem is suggested in a recent article regarding the details
of computer information contracting. See Lemley, supra note 7 (analyzing the use of clickwrap and browse-wrap licensing of computer information on websites). I agree with
Lemley that the most significant implication of this development may be the effect on
commercial parties that are unable to invoke various consumer protections statutes,
regulations and judicial decisions, id. at 462, and that we need something akin to the
“battle of the forms” solution to the rise of form paper contracts in the previous century.
Id. at 464. Lemley’s primary concern rests with the increasing enforceability of browsewrap terms against commercial parties that regularly and repeatedly visit websites to
obtain computer information, particularly through the use of robots. Id. at 478 (arguing
that enforcing browse-wrap contract between commercial parties by assuming that
repeated visits to a site constitutes knowledge of the offered terms “may prove
unworkable”). Professor Lemley concludes that we need a substitute for § 2-207 in the
browse-wrap cases involving the use of web applications and the licensing of computer
information, suggesting that perhaps courts ought not enforce terms of use that materially
change the deal. Id. at 482. I am arguing for a more general re-orientation of the law to
deal with click-wrap commercial transactions that might result in unfair surprise or
hardship to a party that finds itself bound to all of the other party’s terms in the course of
contracting for the purchase or sale of goods.
25

Michael Madison provides an insightful assessment of the enforceability of terms of use
according to the property metaphor of “rights of access” and the contract metaphor of
“agreement” in a manner that helps to illuminate some of the general issues that also
pertain to the question of the enforceability of contract terms. See Michael J. Madison,
Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. REV. 433 (2003).
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forms. 26 There is no reason to draw a sharp distinction between
consumers and commercial parties in this respect. As Jean Braucher
Daniel D. Barnhizer, Propertization, Metaphors for Bargaining Power and Control of
the Self in the Information Age, 54 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 69 (2006):

26

Contract scholars have been more or less obsessed with the nondickered, adhesive nature of standardized form contracts for much of
the last century. The modern reality of highly sophisticated forms of
adhesion contract—browse-wrap and click-wrap contracts—appears to
exacerbate the lack of assent and take-it-or-leave-it nature of consumer
adhesion contracts.
Id. at 71.
The Internet-based consumer contract appears to stretch the volitional nature of contract
past the breaking point through the use of browse-wrap and click-wrap terms, and to
deprive e-consumers of all bargaining power, except the naked ability to walk away from
the deal. As Professor Radin has observed, consumer assent to Internet-based adhesion
contracts is even more fictional than with the traditional paper versions. And, as
marketing models grow more sophisticated and intrusive [including data mining to
manipulate consumer choices], they threaten even that tenuous grasp on control. Id. at 81
(citing Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J.
1125, 1155–60 (2000)). See also, Moringiello, supra note 14, at 1309–10, 1319 (arguing
that courts should not apply contract formation rules from the world of paper contracts
without assessing the differences in the signaling function of electronic modes of
contracting, including the fact that in the electronic environment (at least in its early
stages) many consumers may not even understand that there are detailed boilerplate terms
to which they are agreeing).
Jay Feinman has argued that this solicitude for form agreements presented electronically is
part of a broader “unmaking” of modern contract law and a return to classical approaches
to formation. Jay M. Feinman, Un-making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common
Law, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2004). Charles Knapp recently expressed his
concerns about the revival of a formalistic approach to electronic contracting in a brief
footnote response to Randy Barnett’s thesis that clicking “I agree” manifests one’s consent
to be bound:
But typically the signing of a written agreement, even if accompanied by
a series of “initialings” as well, is a one-time action, with substantial
“cautionary” as well as “channeling” aspects. (Recall the well-worn
phrase: “Sign on the dotted line.”) . . . In contrast, on-line transactions
typically involve a whole series of clickings and typings to get from start
to finish; whether any particular one of those has the kind of symbolic
significance equal to the signing of one’s name on a document seems to
me to be extremely dubious.
Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out? An Argument for Strict Scrutiny of
Individual Contracts, 40 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 95, 113 n.71 (2006) (criticizing Randy
Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 635 (2002)).
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Professors Hillman and Rachlinski reach the apparently different conclusion that existing
contract law is “up to the challenge” of the electronic age “because the basic structure and
underlying economics of the standard-form transaction are consistent in both the paper
and electronic worlds.” Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form
Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 434, 495 (2002). However, they
also endorse Llewellyn’s notion of “blanket assent” that is policed by courts on a case-bycase basis, concluding that “courts must continue to be concerned that consumers
unwittingly will enter into standard-form agreements that are primarily exploitative rather
than mutually beneficial.” Id. at 485. Thus, they appear to reject an overly formalist
approach to assent in electronic forms.
This discussion often is held in the shadow of economic theorizing about efficient markets
and the costs of paternalistic interventions, but more recent behavioral research explains
how adhesion contracts in the consumer setting can be inefficient and oppressive despite
the claims of law and economics scholars. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality,
Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1217 (2003)
(arguing that research establishes that “the fundamental cause of inefficient terms in form
contracts lies in the boundedly rational approaches buyers use to evaluate information and
make choices in the marketplace,” and suggesting that the doctrine of unconscionability be
revised and applied in light of this source of inefficiency); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The
Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 240–48 (1995)
(contract doctrines relating to standard form agreements are best understood as a response
to bounded rationality rather than an effort to police the exploitation of one party by
another). Robert Prentice has argued in detail that the “Chicago Man” of law and
economics, assumed to be unboundedly rational, has been shown by extensive research to
be implausible; thus, he has been replaced by “K-T Man” of behavioral economics,
assumed to be subject to heuristics and cognitive biases. Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man,
K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663
(2003) (critiquing Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The
Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1907 (2002), and Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should
Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67
(2002)). Prentice provides a powerful argument in favor of a cautious and pragmatic
adoption of the lessons of behavioral decision theory.
Policy prescriptions based on complicated but very real facts have more
promise than those based on elegant but very wrong theory. . . . The
policy prescriptions offered by legal decision theorists will never be
incontestable. They will seldom be simple. However, for K-T Man to
have more descriptive, explanatory, predictive, and prescriptive power
than Chicago Man, people need only be systematically (not universally
and uniformly) subject to the various heuristics and biases discussed in
the literature. And they are. . . .
Despite the limitations of social science research . . . the debate over
whether the economists’ Chicago Man or the psychologists’ K-T Man
better describes reality is over; the psychologists won.
Prentice, supra note 24, at 1771, 1774.
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notes, protective legislation and common-law doctrines “are explicitly
or in practice restricted to consumer contracts, . . . [b]ut line-drawing
is commonly highly underinclusive and perhaps occasionally
overinclusive.” 27 Although Braucher argues against creating a new
“small business” category for analysis, she does suggest that courts
consider the context of the transaction more carefully. 28 Larry Garvin
has detailed how the sharp consumer-commercial distinction in
contract law fails to match reality, 29 but he too urges that we not
compound the error by simply creating an intermediate category of

It would be a mistake to adopt specific legal rules based on a supposed truth about how
parties deviate from rational behavior, but it seems plain enough that we have confirmed
experimentally what people have known intuitively since the emergence of literature,
religion and philosophy: people never act in a wholly rational manner that can provide a
steady backdrop for the adoption of specific legal rules.
Jean Braucher, The Failed Promise of the UCITA Mass-Market Concept and Its Lessons
for Standard Policing of Standard Form Contracts, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 393,
396–97 (2003).

27

28

Braucher reasons:
A business may be small but make a large, negotiated contract in which
all terms are carefully considered after investigation of available
alternatives. On the other hand, a large business may make a relatively
small transaction in which it would not make economic sense to
negotiate or even shop over terms, especially complex ones.

Id. at 397.
Garvin argues that small businesses are regularly placed on the “commercial” side of
contract law’s bifurcated system of rules, although in many situations they more closely
resemble consumers.

29

“In many ways, small business most resemble consumers and nonmerchants in their abilities to deal with risk, whether financially or
cognitively, to secure and process information, and to fend for
themselves in the market. Nevertheless, they are generally—almost
invariably—treated like merchants. Small businesses thus get the worst
of each dichotomy. In their dealings with consumers, small businesses
must give protections based on asymmetries that may not exist. In
their dealings with larger businesses, small businesses are treated as
though the parties are essentially equal, which will not usually be true
save in the most formal sense.”
Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract Law, 40
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 297 (2005).
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“small business.” 30 At this juncture, it is sufficient to note that the
loss of the force-field protections of §2-207 by commercial parties
might lead to unacceptable results on the fringes for business entities
that find themselves subject to surprising and unreasonable clickwrap terms, but in response to which they are unable to utilize
consumer protection statutes and case law.

C. STRATEGIES FOR RECLAIMING THE
FORCE-FIELD PROTECTION OF § 2-207
Article 2 effectively solved the problem of standard form contracts
by permitting commercial parties to wage battles with their forms and
thereby achieve the “force-field” protection of § 2-207. In contrast,
consumers do not use forms in contracting. Consequently, a large
body of consumer-oriented law developed in statutory, regulatory, and
common law forms to ensure the integrity of consumer contracting.
However, commercial parties that no longer exchange forms in the
course of contracting may find themselves in a strange new world in
which they no longer have “force-field” protection, nor are they able
to avail themselves of consumer protection law. The question then
becomes whether a commercial party might recover the benefits of
§ 2-207 in this new, post-battle of the forms contracting environment.
Commercial parties might regain the benefits of § 2-207 in several
ways. First, a party confronted with a sign-wrap form could, relatively
easily, include a handwritten notation at the time that it signs the
document stating that its “assent is withheld unless the seller assents
to the terms and conditions located at http://www.goodspurchaser.
com/terms.html.” This strategy would simply transfer the battle of
the forms to the battle of the URLs within a single form; in these
circumstances, courts might preserve the force-field protection of
§ 2-207 for the parties. Of course, if the seller responded to such a
strategy by insisting that the offending addition be stricken and that
the other party agree to all of its terms and conditions, this would
The vast diversity in small businesses creates a “messy” reality, “and suggests that a onesize-fits-all approach to treating small business in contract and commercial law will fail.”
Id. at 370. Recent research suggests that the simplifying nomothetic assumption that all
consumers share the same cognitive deficits is misleading. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive
Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 207 (2006). This does
not undermine the claim that behavioral decision theory is an improvement over the
assumed rational actor of economic theory, even if it cannot paint a complete picture of all
human action, see Prentice, supra note 26, at 1765–67, but it does counsel against
repeating the same mistake of theoretical over-generalizing that afflicted the approach of
law and economics.
30
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elevate the transaction to an express agreement as to the terms.
Except in rare cases involving extreme overreaching, commercial law
would properly enforce such an agreement reached by express
manifestation of an intention to incorporate only one party’s terms.
The point, of course, is that § 2-207 is premised on the assumption
that most commercial parties do not have the time or the inclination
to negotiate an agreement to this level of detail, nor will either party
want to sacrifice the deal by insisting that the other party agree to all
of its terms. Many commercial parties are likely to proceed with the
transaction despite the “battling” notation on the signature line, as
long as they both believe that they have successfully powered-up the
force-field protections of § 2-207.
As indicated above, though, parties will move aggressively to adopt
click-wrap contracting to achieve the advantages of computerization
and to ensure that their terms are incorporated in the contract. Faced
with a click-wrap offer, a commercial party might pursue several
strategies to overcome the developing click-wrap dogma that the
offering party’s terms will exclusively govern the transaction. Perhaps
the most direct response would be to use actual express assent to
establish the terms of the contract. For parties that anticipate an
ongoing relationship, it might be cost-effective for them to negotiate
detailed terms that could be embodied in a master agreement that
establishes important terms such as those governing default or the
means for resolving disputes. This strategy would counter the
purported agreement of the click-wrap format with a genuinely
express (dickered) agreement between the parties.
Nevertheless, there are likely to be several problems with
addressing the click-wrap scenario in this direct manner. One of the
primary functions of the battle of the forms was that it empowered the
parties to raise the contracting force-field of § 2-207 to protect
themselves without having to negotiate all of the pertinent terms of
the agreement. In contrast, the “master agreement” strategy imposes
significant additional costs on the parties and is unlikely to be widely
utilized in everyday transactions. More important, the master
agreement will not be able to thwart terms incorporated by later clickwrap ordering, because § 2-209 ensures that modifications are
enforceable without additional consideration. Even the most carefully
negotiated master agreement can be negated by the terms that the
buyer might be deemed to have later expressly accepted by clicking “I
agree,” to the extent that these later terms are effective modifications
of the master agreement under the liberal provisions of § 2-209(1), (2)
and (3), or constitute a waiver of rights under § 2-209(4) and (5).
Even if the master agreement contains a “no oral modification” clause,
contemporary commercial law regards an electronic assent to a click-
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wrap agreement as creating a record sufficient to support the
modification of the master agreement. The parties might provide in
the master agreement that all modifications must be in written form,
rather than electronic form, but this would jeopardize subsequent
minor modifications that might be concluded by an exchange of emails and thereby disrupt reasonable commercial expectations. 31
The difficulties that arise in preventing later modifications would
best be handled by the general obligation of the parties to deal with
each other in good faith. 32 Because modifications are construed as a
continuation of the original agreement that would require additional
consideration, rather than as a new agreement, all modifications
trigger the parties’ general obligation to act in good faith when
performing or enforcing their rights under the contract. 33 Courts
might be tempted to characterize the seller’s actions as being in bad
faith (both as dishonesty in fact and also as actions that do not
conform to reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing) if the
seller countermands the terms of the master agreement through clickwrap contracting rather than by obtaining actual assent to the change
in terms. This seemingly sensible characterization raises a quandary
for the courts, though, because it forces them to acknowledge the lack
of genuine assent that is part of most click-wrap contracting. Some
courts might find that the strong validation of click-wrap agreements
in legal precedents ties their hands, while others might distinguish the
situation in light of the reasonable expectations engendered by the
master agreement. To summarize, parties are likely to hesitate to use
master agreements because the added time and cost might not be
successful in withstanding a click-wrap modification. 34
The principle of freedom of contract is recognized both in the UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS
ACT § 5 (2000) and the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15
U.S.C. § 7001(b)(2) (2000), effectively permitting parties to agree not to accept electronic
records for contracting purposes. The traditional “battle of the forms” would also provide
force-field protections to the parties at the secondary level of modification. If two parties
reached a master agreement, and then one party enclosed a standard form invoice with the
goods, it would be ineffective unless accepted by the recipient. In the event that parties to
a master agreement exchanged forms with respect to a particular shipment, the force-field
protections of U.C.C. § 2-207 would guide the determination of the terms if the nonmirroring forms created an agreement to modify under U.C.C. §§ 2-207 (1) and 2-209.
31

32

U.C.C. § 2-209, cmt. 2 (2000).

Id., § 1-304 provides that every performance and enforcement of a contractual duty must
be undertaken in good faith.

33

Because most ongoing contractual relationships governed by a master agreement are
relational in nature, it would be unlikely that the seller would seek to gain and enforce an

34

296

I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

[Vol. 4:2

The most difficult scenario involves a pure click-wrap transaction,
in which the only documentation of the transaction occurs when the
buyer enters data on the seller’s website and then clicks “I agree.” The
buyer can invoke § 2-207 only by countering with its own form, but in
an Internet setting this can be difficult. A buyer could click “I agree,”
and then type “assent is withheld unless seller agrees to the terms and
conditions located at http://www.goodspurchaser.com/terms.html” in
a space provided for comments or additional details. This action
would transform the transaction into a typical “battle of the forms”
scenario, which would give effect to both parties’ force-field under § 2207.
However, there may be a number of difficulties with this attempt
to invoke § 2-207 in the click-wrap context. First, there may be an
issue regarding the effectiveness of the notation on the click-wrap site
if the party’s business is completely automated. Although the Uniform
Computer Information Transaction Act (“UCITA”) has failed and no
longer is supported by the Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”), in
some respects it might represent something akin to a Restatement
and, therefore, be influential in how courts address these issues.
UCITA § 206(c) provides that the terms of a contract concluded
between an electronic agent and a person does not “include a term
provided by the individual if the individual had reason to know that
the electronic agent could not react to the term.” 35 In short, when
advantage over the buyer through click-wrap modifications. But despite the fact that many
commercial dealings are relational, the courthouses never seem to want for business. The
scenario that I describe in the text is most likely to occur if there is a serious problem with
the business relationship caused by economic distress or party animosity that leads both
parties to direct their lawyers to fight for the upper hand. At this point, the standard terms
and conditions associated with the “I agree” button will be mined for their value, and the
other party is likely to be surprised that it may have continually overridden the master
agreement through the years with click-wrap modifications.
An “electronic agent” is defined as “a computer program, or electronic or other
automated means, used independently to initiate an action, or to respond to electronic
messages or performances, on the person’s behalf without review or action by an individual
at the time of the action or response to the message or performance.” UNIF. COMPUTER
INFO. TRANSACTION ACT § 102(a)(27) (1999).
35

Amended Article 2 embodies this same principle regarding contract formation in an
electronic environment. U.C.C. § 2-204(4)(b) (2003) (“A contract is formed if the
individual takes actions that the individual is free to refuse to take or makes a statement,
and the individual has reason to know that the actions or statements will: . . . (ii) indicate
acceptance of an offer, regardless of other expressions or actions by the individual to which
the electronic agent cannot react.”). As explained in comment 5, this “subsection validates
an anonymous click-through transaction,” but leaves the determination of the terms to
§ 2-207. Id.
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dealing with an automated website, a party is unlikely to prevail on
the basis of its attempt to inject terms into the transaction. A more
practical problem arises if the website simply does not provide any
space to make such a notation; this scenario leaves the other party no
option other than to abort the transaction, or, complete it and then
send its form by traditional means after placing the order. Adopting a
“battling form sent later” approach will, undoubtedly, be ineffective
because the click-wrap agreement would constitute a final agreement,
with the later documentation being viewed as a proposal for
modification that must be expressly accepted by the party in order to
be effective against it.
Therefore, as parties adopt a click-wrap approach to contracting, it
will be difficult to maintain the advantages that § 2-207 has brought to
commercial contracting, unless the parties find that it is economical to
conclude a master agreement that is drafted in a manner that
attempts to make inadvertent modifications through future click-wrap
transactions ineffective. Consequently, courts will likely need to find a
doctrinal substitute for the increasingly moribund § 2-207.

III.

AFTER THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS

Commercial parties generally are left to their own fate when they
have agreed to contract terms through an express manifestation of
their assent, inasmuch as most protective legislation and case law is
oriented toward consumers who are viewed as unskilled and
unpracticed in the ways of contracting and commerce. Consequently,
a commercial party that finds itself subject to click-wrap agreements
that include unforeseen and undesirable terms will not have many
available strategies for avoiding them. Many commentators will argue
that the reputational constraints of the market will provide a sufficient
check on overreaching, but this response misses the crux of the
problem. 36 A party seeking the efficiencies of web-based transactions
is likely to employ a legal team that will draft terms and conditions
designed to provide every bit of leverage possible for the extreme
cases or situations, knowing that the party is likely to proceed, in most
cases, on the basis of sound business practice rather than with the goal
See, e.g., Hillman & Rachlinkski, supra note 26, at 443–45 (arguing that market
constraints are real but imperfect, and suggesting the need for judicial intervention);
Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 975,
976–80 (2005) (describing market constraints on exploitive seller behavior but
acknowledging that they may be “insufficient to constrain sellers’ tendencies to exploit
buyers” and might call for regulatory intervention).
36
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of exacting every benefit available under the strict terms of the
agreement. 37 Questions arise in the fringe cases, when parties cease
Stewart Macaulay summarized this commercial reality in his commentary on the
significance of Ian Macneil’s relational theory of contract.

37

Some firms attempt to arm themselves with end-game strategies by
placing “heads I win, tails you lose” clauses in form contracts unlikely to
be read until trouble arises. . . . Firms hide loopholes in the fine print,
knowing that these terms will not be the subject of negotiations. These
terms are used to ward off legal liability by providing bright-line rules.
Rather than having to prove such things as fraud, material failure of
performance, or substantial breach, the firm’s lawyers give themselves
an easy-to-establish standard.
Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts about the
Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa Bermstien, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 775, 796 (2000).
The factors leading some parties to “load up” the terms and conditions are straightforward:
Furthermore, as some commentators have argued, businesses
themselves might be ignorant of the terms offered in their boilerplate
agreements. Businesses often delegate the job of drafting their terms to
lawyers, who believe that they can best serve their clients by composing
an arsenal of one-sided terms without regard to the business
environment, or for that matter, anything else. In addition, business
managers might rely on some of the same cognitive processes that affect
consumers. In particular businesses might worry too much about
protecting themselves from rare events, overestimating the likelihood of
such events because of a few salient incidents.
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 26, at 444.
There may be industries, indeed many industries, in which competitive pressures lead
parties to draft even-handed terms, but it would be foolish to assume that this holds true
throughout the commercial world. The problem arises when one of the parties suddenly
ignores the “bargain in fact of the parties” and insists upon compliance with form
documents long-since filed and largely ignored during the course of the relationship. As
Macaulay observes:
[The] legal staff may write a detailed contract that is not understood by
the executive representing the corporation in negotiations. This is
likely to be the case when it is a complex printed standard-form
agreement. The executive negotiating the contract will know that the
people on the other side will not read and understand the document.
Moreover, the executive may know that the other side is unlikely to
have the document reviewed by a lawyer. Then all business is
transacted in ways inconsistent with the lawyer’s contract, which has
been buried in the files. If a court allows such a written contract to wipe
out a history of interaction, then its decision may be based on
expectations and reliance only in a fictional sense.
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operating on the basis of business goals and relationships, and seek to
maximize their legally enforceable rights. Moreover, reputational
constraints are not a unitary check on a particular party’s behavior.
Customer relations imperatives may shape the treatment of most
customers most of the time, but not all customers all of the time. 38
Macaulay, supra note 37, at 795. The punch line, though, comes with Macaulay’s
observation that when the end-game arrives and the lawyers run for the form documents,
“Section 2-207 of the Code attempts to sort out the mess.” Id. at 798. With the “battle of
the forms” era drawing to a close, we may be left with only a formalist mess.
38 A commercial party might believe that putting extreme one-sided terms in its forms is
justified because it will invoke these terms only when faced with a “bad buyer.” Clayton P.
Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WISC. L. REV. 679, 703–13
(2004). Of course, this discretion provides latitude for the party to exercise these rights in
ways that are not benign. Id. at 707–08. Additionally, this argument ignores the fact that
parties seeking to enforce their standard terms will be as subject to the limits of cognition
caused by heuristics and biases as the other party when considering the standard terms.
Ichiro Kobayashi makes a similar point in connection with consumer transactions in
greater detail:

Suppose that a seller repeatedly sells machines to buyers and the seller
regularly accepts refunds out of concern for his reputation. The seller
does not desire to include in a contract a clause that the seller accepts
any refund because the clause may not give the buyer incentives to use
the machine in an appropriate manner. Contracting parties do not
explicitly write the seller’s refund policy in their contract. Put another
way, parties intentionally write stricter contract terms, and the fair
distribution of costs and benefits is delegated to a flexible application of
informal norms. Transactional substance is expelled out of the formal
legal regime, and contracting parties create non-legal norms to reflect
any substance.
Ichiro Kobayashi, Private Contracting and Business Models of Electronic Commerce, 13
U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 161, 172 (2005).
Kobayashi suggests that the normative implication of this new business reality is that
consumers might legitimately be bound to unread electronic terms as the cost of obtaining
the firm’s business model. Id. at 183–84. Courts should intervene on behalf of consumers
only when the written terms exploit consumers in a manner that is outside the scope of the
business model’s protective features (citing the Specht case as an example), but not with
respect to a dispute that is within the scope of the incentive mechanisms established by the
business model (citing the ProCD case). Id. at 184–85.
Kobayashi’s approach to consumer contracting is consistent with my focus on the need for
courts to ensure that agreements are enforced to protect the “reasonable expectations” of
commercial parties, although he frames his argument in the language of efficiency:
To summarize, because electronic commerce is more automated and
standardized than paper-based transactions, contract term
interpretation must be made by considering the overall business model
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This is not so much to say that the legal clauses are unimportant, as to
recognize that the legal regime is relatively unimportant for much of
everyday commercial life. 39 However, the enforceable terms of the
and its embedded incentive mechanisms that support informal selfenforcement. . . . It allocates formal and informal regimes so well that
relatively formalistic interpretation of contract terms (whether those
terms are browsewrapped or clickwrapped in a website screen) are
generally justified as an interpretation principle. This does not mean
that courts should not consider consumer exploitation, market Internet
fraud, or other failure of efficient allocation of costs and benefits arising
from the novelty of electronic commerce. Although courts are unlikely
to emphasize an aspect of contract formation procedure, where
accessibility to those online terms and adequate notice are especially
questioned, such requirements of accessibility and adequate notice do
not necessarily give equitable solutions to each dispute. . . . This article
therefore suggests that when such issues concerning consumer
protection are argued, courts must at least be sensitive to overall
efficiency underlying the merchant’s business model in interpreting
contract terms.
Id. at 185–86.
This theoretical defense of one-sided terms, even when tempered by Kobayashi’s
recognition of the need for judicial protection in certain respects, does not appear to be
relevant to the sphere of commercial transactions. A recent article suggests that one-sided
contracts may prove efficient in circumstances where the offering party (generally, a
commercial seller) is bound by reputational constraints, but the accepting party (generally,
a sporadic buyer in a competitive market) is not, since the one-sided terms permit the
seller to police overreaching by buyers. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, OneSided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006). The
authors correctly note that this rationale loses much of its force when applied to
commercial transactions, since commercial buyers presumably are equally motivated by
reputational constraints as are sellers. Id. at 835. Thus, even Kobayashi’s recognition of
the limits of the theory when applied to consumer transactions provides an insufficient
corrective because the theoretical presuppositions no longer hold when the transaction is a
commercial transaction.
A recent article suggests that business models of electronic commerce have developed to
ensure performance and, thereby, avoid the costs of legal action, especially given the lack of
reputational constraints in a highly dynamic global marketplace with relatively easy entry.
Kobayashi, supra note 38, at 170. Kobayashi details how “operators of electronic
commerce invented various bonding mechanisms, such as credit card chargeback systems,
online payment mechanisms, electronic money, escrow services, and online feedback
systems” to counterbalance reputational deficits. Id. at 171.

39

The Internet may very well develop in ways that empower parties subject to standard-form
click-wrap agreements, which suggests that courts should regard these developments as an
important part of the commercial context when assessing the validity of agreements. This
would shift the debate from unpersuasive arguments about the effect of marginal
consumers protecting all consumers by means of their ex ante review of terms, to a more
plausible claim that ex post analysis of contract terms offered by commercial parties in
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contract will have very real effects on the parties’ behavior in the event
of severe financial distress, traumatic market realignment, or
animosity between the contracting parties that drives the parties to
call in the litigators and unleash their fury. 40 The important question
remains: if the parties have entered a click-wrap agreement, does the
law place any limits on the exercise of contract prerogative even if
imposing these limits is necessary only in exceptional cases?
In cases that involve truly egregious oppression, the courts might
use the doctrine of unconscionability to free a commercial party from
such terms, but courts have set a high bar for commercial parties to
prevail on an unconscionability analysis. At present, courts are
unlikely to extend the safety-valve function of unconscionability from
the consumer context to general commercial parties, except in the
most egregious cases that most closely resemble an oppressive
consumer transaction.
An alternative strategy would be to argue that standard form
adhesion contracts that are formed by click-wrap technology should
be enforced according to the reasonable expectations of the parties,
rather than according to a literalist and context-free reading of the
boilerplate language. This legal strategy would confront the issues
raised when commercial parties lose the force-field protection of
§ 2-207 in the emerging electronic contracting environment, but may
be even less likely to succeed than an expansion of the
unconscionability safety-valve. What is at stake in the reasonable
expectations challenge to click-wrap agreements is no less than the
competitive markets can be communicated effectively to prospective consumers in a
variety of ways. See Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: A Fresh
Approach to Online Standard Form Contracts in the Age of Online User Participation
(Draft 2007), 57, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
984765#PaperDownload (developing policy prescriptions for regulatory intervention
based on the degree to which there is an abundant “ex post-ex ante information flow” that
can “deter firms the vendor from including imbalanced provisions” in their standard form
contracts). See also Raymond T. Nimmer, 2 Info. Law § 12:47 (2004) (“The online
environment, however, often offers wider alternatives and greater sources of information
that, even in consumer transactions often renders [the doctrines of unconscionability and
reasonable expectations] inapplicable. . . . Indeed, the online environment, which is less
pressured and can permit closer review of terms by a potential user would seem to weigh
more often in favor of more strongly enforcing those agreements.”). Of course, this
assumption is subject to empirical challenge by those who question the ability of parties to
optimize their behavior by considering all available information. See sources cited supra
note 26.
This is best characterized as “going into Warren Zevon mode.” See WARREN ZEVON,
LAWYERS, GUNS AND MONEY, EXCITABLE BOY (Elektra Records 1978) (“Send lawyers, guns
and money/The shit has hit the fan.”).
40
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“soul of contract law,” 41 and it is quite possible that the devil may
already have sealed this deal.
To provide a focus for the following discussion, it will be helpful to
think about a hypothetical case that permits consideration of the
issues in concrete terms. Consider the case of an attorney who resigns
from her firm to purchase an indoor tennis facility in her town. She
will manage not only the tennis and fitness memberships, but also a
pro shop that sells a variety of merchandise manufactured by national
corporations. As she begins “ordering” from the manufacturers over
the Internet, she constantly clicks “I agree” after entering the relevant
data, assuming that the boilerplate terms are unexceptional, and in
any event are nonnegotiable. Moreover, she uses sophisticated
software to manage her membership, schedule courts, and maintain
financial records, and this software package proclaims that it is
subject to End-User License Agreements (“EULAs”). This is not only a
commercial transaction, but also one that is entered into by a
sophisticated individual.
Is it automatically the case that every term included as part of the
click-wrap agreement should be binding, regardless of the nature of
the term or the relevant circumstances? Would she be bound to
permit the software vendor to access her computer, to refrain from
customizing the software for her needs, and even to refrain from
publicly criticizing the software? Would she have to arbitrate disputes
in a distant venue? Would she be subject to restrictions on how she
promoted and sold the name-brand merchandise to her customers?
Would her ability to return merchandise be subject to specific and
time-sensitive restrictions?
To make this hypothetical scenario realistic, one should assume
that the seller is experiencing some form of financial distress, or that
the market is experiencing similar disruption, leading the seller to
seek to exact the full benefit of the terms drafted by its legal staff.

A. UNCONSCIONABILITY ANALYSIS
The first line of defense, although unlikely to succeed in many
cases, is to argue that one or more terms of the click-wrap agreement
are unenforceable because they are unconscionable.
Common
wisdom holds that commercial parties are rarely afforded relief under
§ 2-302, and the cases cited by the treatise writers bear out this

Robert H. Jerry, II, Insurance, Contract, and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5
CONN. INS. L.J. 21, 23, 57 (1998).

41
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wisdom. 42 Courts regularly make statements to this effect as if it were
a principle of the doctrine itself. 43 The commercial cases in which
courts have invoked the unconscionability doctrine to police the
agreement invariably involve parties who are unschooled farmers,
poorly educated small business owners, and other “quasi-consumers”
acting in a commercial capacity. 44 Judge Posner manifested this
42 See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, U.C.C. § 4-9, at 237 (4th ed. 1995) (citing
cases for the proposition that “courts have not generally been solicitous of business persons
in the name of unconscionability”); 1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE
SERIES § 2-302:6 (regarding the applicability of the doctrine to commercial transactions).
Hawkland summarizes:

One remarkable pattern has emerged from the hundred cases or so that
have been decided to date under Section 2-302, and this is that the
doctrine of unconscionability is not a major force in transactions
between business entities. Stated conversely, the doctrine has been
used almost exclusively in consumer transactions. The reasons for this
phenomenon are plain. For the most part, unconscionability has to do
with taking advantage of ignorant people by imposing surprise results
or harsh and oppressive terms on them. Often this happens because the
consumer has no “meaningful choice.” That is to say, a gross inequality
in bargaining power between the consumer, on the one hand, and a
merchant, on the other, plus the fact that the consumer lacks the
experience, training, skill, and help to identify alternative courses of
action, may leave him in a “take-it-or-leave-it” position subject to
deceitful or oppressive actions or both on the part of the other party.
Businessmen, on the other hand, usually have alternatives available,
and have the skill, training, experience, and help to take care of
themselves in business deals. Accordingly, the courts have been willing
to distinguish commercial from consumer transactions in invoking the
doctrine of unconscionability.
In Keystone Aeronautics v. R.J.
Enstrom[, 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974)], for example, the court stated: ‘A
social policy aimed at protecting the average consumer by prohibiting
blanket immunization of the manufacturer or seller through the use of
standardized disclaimers engenders little resistance. But when the
setting is changed and the buyer and seller are both business entities, ...
the social policy loses its raison d’etre.’
43 See TIBCO Software, v. Gordon Food Serv., No. 1:03-CV-25, 2003 WL 21683850 (W.D.
Mich. July 3, 2003) (Unconscionability “is rarely found to exist in agreements entered into
by two commercial parties.”); Citizens Ins. Co. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 802 F. Supp.
133, 145 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (Unconscionability “is rarely found to exist in a commercial
setting. Citizens has failed to show that this case presents the requisite extraordinary
circumstances.”); Salt River Project Agr. Imp. & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
694 P.2d 198, 204 (Wyo. 1984) (“Although a commercial purchaser is not doomed to
failure in pressing an unconscionability claim . . . findings of unconscionability in a
commercial setting are rare.”).

See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 42, at 240 (“One moral of the foregoing cases is that
when a business-person is poorly educated, ‘over a barrel,’ or a victim of fine print, a court

44

304

I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

[Vol. 4:2

attitude by issuing (in dictum) a warning to corporations: “[F]or
future reference we remind Northrup and companies like it that the
defense of unconscionability was not invented to protect multi-billion
dollar corporations against mistakes committed by their employees,
and indeed has rarely succeeded outside the area of consumer
contracts.” 45 On occasion, courts have been willing to employ
unconscionability analysis in cases that do not involve extreme
disparities in sophistication between the parties. However, it is

may invalidate a clause that otherwise would stand up between ordinary business
persons.”); Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., Inc., 767 F.2d 296, 298, 301 (6th Cir. 1985)
(Plaintiff “commercial farmers” successfully argued that the form contract was
unconscionable, with the court noting “that Harris Seed is a large national producer and
distributor of seed, dealing here with independent, relatively small farmers” with limited
alternative suppliers who all had adopted the offensive clause.); Johnson v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 304 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (finding that an exclusion of consequential
damages signed by Mobil and an illiterate, high school dropout who was a gas station
dealer was unconscionable).
Northrup Corp. v. Litronic, Ltd., 29 F.3d 1173, 1179–80 (7th Cir. 1994) (cautioning
Northrup after application of the knock-out rule under § 2-207 rendered its
unconscionability argument moot). See also Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d
1346, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (rejecting application of the unconscionability doctrine in favor
of a Fortune 1000 company and concluding that in “an agreement relating to confidential
information, negotiated between commercial entities, it is not the judicial role to rewrite
the contract and impose terms that these parties did not make.”), and Potomic Elec. Power
Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 572, 579 (D. D.C. 1974). The court in
Potomic stated:

45

Finally, plaintiff raises the issue of the unconscionability of the
exculpatory clauses. The negotiated agreement between these parties
was not a contract between two small unknowledgeable shop keepers
but between two sophisticated corporations each with comparable
bargaining power and fully aware of what they were doing. The
negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract were
deliberate, detailed and consumed more than two years. PEPCO’s
representatives were experienced and the final agreement was reviewed
by their corporate legal staff. While the evidence shows that other than
Westinghouse, there was only one other domestic manufacturer with
the capability of marketing the turbine-generator, there is nothing to
indicate that PEPCO was precluded from contracting with that
manufacturer or even foreign manufacturers. Nor is there any evidence
in the record showing that PEPCO was a reluctant and unwilling
purchaser, overreached and forced to yield to onerous terms imposed
by Westinghouse.
Id. See generally NIMMER, 2 INFO. LAW, supra note 39, at note 9.
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unlikely that these cases suggest a solid basis for developing a
response to the potential abuses of click-wrap contracting. 46
If unconscionability plays any role in commercial click-wrap
transactions, it will almost certainly not serve as a means for
launching a general challenge to this mode of contracting. In a recent

46 Perhaps the best example of such a case is In re Teleserve Syss., Inc. (MCI Telecomm.
Corp.), 230 A.D.2d 585 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). The court held that an arbitration clause
that would require the claimant to pay a filing fee of $204,000 to initiate its claim for
compensatory damages of $40 million was “unreasonable, unjust, and unconscionable on
its face and may not be enforced.” Id. at 593. The claimant was a sophisticated entity that
had invested over $2.4 million dollars to build a business network to perform the contract,
and had caused subagents to invest an additional $2 million. Invoking unconscionability
to protect such a party is unusual. Id. at 590. However, the factual context surrounding
this case is dramatic. The claimant had been strung along for months by MCI despite
making clear that it was in severe financial distress, and the arbitration clause in question
was presented to the ailing claimant as part of modifications to their agreement intended
to resolve the disputes. Id. at 587–90. The claimant specifically questioned the new
arbitration clause, but stated that it had no choice but to sign the agreement. Id. at 590.
The large filing fee was particularly troublesome for the claimant because it had “exhausted
its capital and ‘closed its doors’” as a result of MCI’s actions, leaving it without the ability to
pay the filing fee. Id. at 587. The facts alleged by the claimant present a classic case of
economic duress and bad faith, and the court’s unconscionability holding regarding the
filing fee enabled the claimant to file for arbitration under the more favorable terms of the
prior agreement and to obtain a remedy for the alleged breach by MCI.

A more typical exceptional case (if there can be such a thing) is presented by Gianni Sport
Ltd. v. Gantos, Inc., 391 N.W.2d 760 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). Gianni also involved a
compelling set of facts and sharp differences in bargaining power. The buyer’s form
purchase order included a clause on the reverse side that stated: “Buyer reserves the right
to terminate by notice to Seller all or any part of this Purchase Order with respect to Goods
that have not actually been shipped by Seller or as to Goods which are not timely delivered
for any reason whatsoever.” Id. at 761. In late September, the buyer cancelled its June
order for an October delivery of women’s holiday clothing, leaving the seller with
manufactured clothes but no realistic ability to find another buyer for the time-sensitive
holiday market, leading the plaintiff to sell the clothes to the original buyer for a negotiated
50% discount. Id. The court began by noting that Michigan case law applying the
unconscionability doctrine to commercial parties “is sparse,” but found that the substantial
difference in bargaining power between the small manufacturer and the large purchaser
was symptomatic of the industry, and that such clauses “were standard practice because”
the buyers were the “big sharks” that could impose terms at will. Id. at 761–62. The court
affirmed the trial court’s holding that the term in question was unreasonable, and the
parties had uneven bargaining power. Id. at 763. It should be noted that a more
appropriate litigation strategy in this case would have been to challenge the buyer’s
strategic cancellation and re-negotiation as a bad faith exercise of the buyer’s nominal
contract rights, but perhaps the “big sharks” in this industry are so ferocious and insatiable
as to render the “observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing” a nullity,
leading the lawyers and the court to look to the doctrine of unconscionability to find a
normative limit for the buyer’s behavior.
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click-wrap case a commercial party argued that imposing terms on a
buyer that has already paid the purchase price by requiring consent to
an End User License Agreement is unconscionable. The court made
short work of this argument, finding that this manner of contracting is
not in itself procedurally unconscionable. 47 Most courts would likely
adopt this approach and conclude that merely requiring another party
to signal its assent by means of a click-wrap agreement will not
establish sufficient procedural infirmity to provide a basis for an
unconscionability analysis. 48 Courts generally use a “sliding scale”
approach that requires some measure of both procedural and
substantive elements of unconscionability.
The untroubled
assumption that clicking an “I agree” icon is equivalent to manifesting
assent makes it difficult to establish the existence of procedural
elements of unconscionability in a commercial transaction. 49
47

The court stated:
The parties in this case did have unequal bargaining power because
Blizzard is the sole seller of its software licenses; however, the
defendants had the choice to select a different video game, to agree to
the terms and gain the software and access to battle.net, or to disagree
and return the software for a full refund of their money. [The
defendants were not ignorant consumers, but instead were savvy
programmers who reverse engineered the source code.] Next, there was
no surprise about the contract terms [because the defendants were on
notice of the terms and had thirty days to return the game]. Therefore,
the Court finds that the licensing agreements were not procedurally
unconscionable.

Davidson & Assoc., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1179–80 (E.D. Mo.
2004). Because the EULA terms in question concerned the prohibition on reverse
engineering, the court concluded without analysis that the terms did “not impose harsh or
oppressive terms” and therefore were not substantively unconscionable. Id. at 1180.
Courts sometimes note that commercial parties simply will not be given relief even from
terms that are procedurally unconscionable to some degree. See O’Quin v. Verizon
Wireless, 256 F. Supp. 2d 512, 517 (M.D. La. 2003) (holding that shrink-wrap/terms-later
contracting is enforceable, and noting that “courts in Louisiana and elsewhere have
countenanced some modicum of adhesionary terms, or evidence of procedural
unconscionability in contract formation, in the name of ‘economic efficiency’”).
Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d, at 239–42 (holding that click-wrap contracting is not
procedurally unconscionable, and the forum selection clause is not substantively
unconscionable); In re RealNetworks, Inc., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341, at *5–7
(holding that click-wrap contracting is not procedurally unconscionable, and the
arbitration clause is not substantively unconscionable).

48

See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000)
(noting that the “more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of
procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is

49
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On a few occasions, courts have found terms to be unconscionable
even in the absence of procedural unconscionability, including the
infamous shrink-wrap (terms in the box) case, Brower v. Gateway,
2000. 50 On careful examination, though, Brower proves that clickwrap contracts between commercial parties will not be amenable to
unconscionability analysis. In Brower, a class of plaintiffs seeking
compensatory and punitive damages for alleged deceptive practices by
Gateway opposed a motion to dismiss that argued the complaint was
subject to arbitration. The court first held that the agreement was a
“rolling contract” that was not concluded until the consumers ordered
their computer by mail or phone, received the item with the detailed
terms enclosed, and then retained the item for more than the thirtyday return period specified in the enclosed terms. 51 The court fully
effectuated the shrink-wrap contract, finding that “the disputed
arbitration clause is simply one provision of the sole contract
proposed between the parties,” rather than a term proposed by the
seller after the purchase. 52 The court also specifically rejected the idea
that the arbitration clause was unenforceable solely because it was
contained in a standard form contract presented to the consumers. In
doing so, the court reasoned that the consumers had thirty days
within which to examine the product, and the proposed terms before
the contract was concluded. 53
enforceable, and vice versa”); Tacoma Boatbuilding v. Delta Fishing, Nos. 165-72C3–16872C3, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17830, at *20 n.20 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 4, 1980) (“Of course, the
substantive/procedural analysis is more of a sliding scale than a true dichotomy. The
harsher the clause, the less ‘bargaining naughtiness’ that is required to establish
unconscionability.”); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 42, § 4–7 (regarding the relation of
procedural to substantive unconscionability and quoting the Tacoma case). If there is no
recognized procedural unconscionability at work in a case involving two commercial
parties, it seems highly unlikely that a court would invalidate a term of their agreement
under unconscionability analysis.
In a recent article, Robert Hillman argues that proposals to require businesses to post their
e-commerce terms on their website to permit consumers and industry watchdogs to review
the terms prior to deciding to make a purchase might backfire because consumers are very
likely to remain uninformed but the pre-disclosure would likely narrow consumer rights by
eliminating a plausible claim of procedural unconscionability. Robert A. Hillman, Online
Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-standard Terms Backfire?, 104
MICH. L. REV. 837, 854 (2006).
50

Brower v. Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).

51

Id. at 572.

52

Id.

53

Id. at 572–73.
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However, the arbitration provision required the consumers to
arbitrate their disputes in Chicago pursuant to the International
Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) rules. The practical effect of this term
was that the typical consumer seeking actual damages of $1,000
would have to pay a $4,000 advance fee (including $2,000 that was
nonrefundable even if the consumer prevailed), mail all of the
paperwork regarding the arbitration to the ICC offices in France,
travel to Chicago for the arbitration hearing, and be subject to paying
Gateway’s legal fees if Gateway prevailed. Needless to say, the dispute
resolution clause eliminated any practical means for consumers to
obtain relief. It is widely known that the court held that this term was
unconscionable, but the details of the court’s reasoning are only rarely
analyzed in detail.
The court first held that there were no elements of procedural
unconscionability, repeating its analysis that the shrink-wrap method
of contracting provided the consumer with sufficient time to review
the offered terms, which were not buried in dense text or otherwise
hidden from view. The court noted that “the substantive element
alone may be sufficient to render the terms of the provision at issue
unenforceable.” 54 However, one of the cases cited as a precedent
provides what is certainly a more accurate description in noting that
“there have been exceptional cases where a provision of the contract is
so outrageous as to warrant holding it unenforceable on the ground of
substantive unconscionability alone.” 55 The Brower court concluded
that the “excessive cost factor” in arbitrating a dispute was
substantively unconscionable as a matter of law, but upheld the
agreement of the parties to arbitrate their dispute in Chicago. 56 Thus,
54

Id. at 574.

Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 534 N.E.2d 824, 829 (N.Y. 1988) (finding that
the term in question was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable). Most of
the cases cited by the court did not find a term to be unconscionable solely on the basis of
substantive oppression. One of the cited cases did refer to the classic case of a door-todoor salesperson grossly overcharging welfare recipients for consumer goods. See Jones v.
Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (but this is hardly the model of a
case that involves no element of procedural unconscionability).

55

The court did cite In re Teleserve Syss., 659 N.Y.S.2d at 659 (finding an arbitration clause
between two sophisticated business entities to be unconscionable), but as explained in note
46, supra, the factual circumstances in this case hardly support the idea that a contract
term may be declared unconscionable as a matter of law.
56 Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 574–55 (“vacating that portion of the arbitration agreement as
requires arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce,” having already found
that “the possible inconvenience of the chosen site (Chicago) alone” does not rise “to the
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the victory was not particularly meaningful for the plaintiffs now faced
with the obligation to travel to Chicago to seek arbitration of their
individual claims, rather than pursuing a class action.
There are cases that take a more liberal approach to
unconscionability in the electronic contracting setting, but these cases
are undoubtedly outliers. A Pennsylvania Federal District Court
Judge, applying California law, recently ruled in Bragg v. Linden
Research, Inc. 57 that a click-wrap agreement to arbitrate disputes was
both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. This result is
even more extraordinary in light of the fact that the plaintiff was an
attorney who sued a virtual world Internet website for seizing “virtual”
property worth thousands of dollars that he had acquired at the site.
Essentially, the court held that a sophisticated plaintiff engaged in
(virtual) commercial transactions was not subject to an arbitration
clause contained in a click-wrap contract.
In Bragg, the court first held that the arbitration clause included
in the “fourteenth line of the thirteenth paragraph under the heading
‘GENERAL PROVISIONS’ and following provisions regarding the
applicability of export and import laws” was procedurally
unconscionable because it was part of an adhesion contract presented
by a party with stronger bargaining power regarding a product that
could not be attained elsewhere on the Internet. 58 The court found
that the arbitration clause was “buried” in the Terms of Service, and
that these Terms included no explanation of, or reference to, the
extensive fees and cumbersome rules that were triggered by requiring
arbitration by three arbitrators operating under the Rules of
The court conceded that Bragg’s
Arbitration of the ICC. 59
sophistication mitigated the elements of procedural unconscionability,
but that the weakness of this element was counterbalanced by extreme
substantive unconscionability. 60
level of unconscionability”). See also Hauenstein v. Softwrap Ltd., No. C07-0572MJP,
2007 WL 2404624 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 17, 2007) (holding that an arbitration clause
requiring that the parties arbitrate in London is not unconscionable).
57

Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d. 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007).

58 Id. at 603–04. The court cited Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal.
2002) for support, but the district court in Comb emphasized that PayPal customers were
not sophisticated parties, the average transaction amount was $55, and the services offered
by PayPal might have been unique to some degree. Id. at 1173.
59

Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 606.

60

Id. at 606–10.
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Similar to the arbitration provision in Brower, Bragg was required
to arbitrate his disputes under the costly ICC rules in a distant venue,
whereas the defendant was permitted to seize his assets and terminate
the agreement at its sole discretion. 61 The court essentially concluded
that the agreement precluded an effective remedy for breach,
providing instead a “one-sided means which tilts unfairly, in almost
all situations” in favor of the defendant. 62 In the end, Bragg appears
to be the same case as Brower with the one critical difference that,
rather than relying exclusively on substantive unconscionability, the
court found that California law considers all adhesion contracts to be
prima facie evidence of procedural unconscionability. 63

61

Id. at 607–12.

62

Id. at 611.

The California Supreme Court has not yet adopted this reading of the unconscionability
statute, but the federal courts in Bragg and Comb both cited Flores v. Transamerica
HomeFirst, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 4th 846, 853 (1st Dist. 2001) for this proposition. This
element of the Flores opinion has been criticized by other divisions of the Court of Appeals.
See Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp, 128 Cal. App. 4th 1305, 1318 (4th Dist. 2005)
(The court criticized Flores by noting that “courts often reflexively conclude the finding of
an adhesion contract alone satisfies the procedural prong, and immediately move on to the
subject of substantive unconscionability,” and holding that recognizing the agreement “as
an adhesion contract . . . heralds the beginning, not the end, of our inquiry into its
enforceability.”). Consequently, not all courts endorse the Flores rule. See Burke v. E-Bay,
Inc., 2007 WL 1219697 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 24, 2007) (finding that the forum selection clause
under a later iteration of the eBay agreement that was at issue in Comb was enforceable).
63

The Ninth Circuit’s recent opinion in Nagramp v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir.
2006) provides a good indication of the current state of California law. By a 7-5 margin,
the court held that an arbitration provision in a click-wrap contract was unconscionable.
Finding that under “current California law, it is unclear whether a contract of adhesion is
inherently oppressive, and therefore automatically procedurally unconscionable or
whether oppression is a separate element that must be present,” the court concluded that
procedural unconscionability is present when an adhesion contract is presented by a party
with superior bargaining power to a party that has no meaningful choice or ability to
negotiate. Id. at 1281. Although the contract was a commercial franchise agreement
offered to a sophisticated party with experience in the industry, the court concluded that
“MailCoups had overwhelming bargaining power, drafted the contract, and presented it to
Nagrampa on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. While we acknowledge that the evidence of
procedural unconscionability appears minimal, it is sufficient to require us, under
California law, to reach the second prong of the unconscionability analysis.” Id. at 1284.
The arbitration provision was deemed substantively unconscionable because it permitted
MailCoups to secure judicial relief and forced the plaintiff to travel to Boston to arbitrate
her claims, and so “even though the evidence of procedural unconscionability is slight, the
evidence of substantive unconscionability is strong enough to tip the scale and render the
arbitration provision unconscionable.” Id. at 1293. Because California law requires some
measure of procedural unconscionability to support an unconscionability analysis, the
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Against this backdrop, the doctrine of unconscionability does not
hold much promise for commercial parties after the battle of the
forms has ceased to provide them with force-field like protection.
Although it is conceivable that courts might act if one or more terms
imposed by a click-wrap agreement are grossly oppressive, it is far
more likely that they would do so if there was some measure of
Flores rule might best be interpreted as boosting a party over the nominal procedural
unconscionability requirement when the complaining party is in a much weaker position
and is subjected to an adhesion contract that contains terms that are grossly unfair that the
court deems unacceptable. See Pickens v. Blockbuster, Inc., 2004 WL 339594, *7 (Cal.
App. Feb. 24, 2004) (unpublished opinion) (The court held that because “the only
procedurally unconscionable aspect of the late fee [that the consumer plaintiff] can identify
is the fact that it was presented as part of a take-it-or-leave-it contract . . . this may be
enough to show a minimal level of procedural unconscionability [but the consumer
plaintiff] must make a correspondingly much stronger showing of substantive
unconscionability to survive summary judgment.”).
Consequently, the surprising result in Bragg may not suggest that click-wrap commercial
contracts may easily be found to be unconscionable. The limitations of the Bragg case are
best illustrated in a case decided by the same court, speaking through a different judge, two
months earlier. In Feldman v. Google, Inc., 2007 WL 966011 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2007) the
court found that a lawyer’s click-wrap agreement for Google’s advertising services was
enforceable under California law, concluding that a “reasonably prudent internet user
would have known of the existence of terms in the AdWords agreement.” Id. at *9. The
court found that the forum selection clause was not unconscionable, beginning with the
decisive characterization that Flores provides that a term “may be procedurally
unconscionable if it is an adhesion contract.” Id. at *10 (emphasis added). Because other
internet businesses offered advertising services, the court also concluded that the
agreement was not a classic adhesion contract.
A contract is not necessarily one of adhesion simply because it is a form
contract. Courts have recognized the prevalence and importance of
standardized contracts in people’s everyday lives. . . .Because Plaintiff
was a sophisticated purchaser, was not in any way pressured to agree to
the AdWords Agreement, was capable of understanding the
Agreement’s terms, consented to them, and could have rejected the
Agreement with impunity, this court finds that the AdWords Agreement
was not procedurally unconscionable.
Id. at *11. This case, seemingly directly at odds with the result in Bragg two months later,
would appear to capture the sentiment of a strong majority of courts. See supra notes 47–
48 and accompanying text.
The cases can also be distinguished by the fact that Bragg concerned a grossly unfair
dispute resolution clause that effectively eliminated an effective remedy, whereas Feldman
involved only a forum selection clause. The lesson of the Bragg case appears to be that
courts might find a clause unconscionable even in a commercial transaction under extreme
facts. See sources cited supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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procedural unconscionability as well. In most jurisdictions, the case
law indicates clearly that courts are highly unlikely to find that the
click-wrap format itself gives rise to a claim of procedural
unconscionability between commercial parties. Bragg provides
precedent to the contrary, but it establishes a minimum of procedural
unconscionability only on the strength of the court’s finding that
California law so regards all adhesion contracts. 64

B. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
OF COMMERCIAL PARTIES
Click-wrap contracting is a mode of presenting standard terms in
what might be argued is a more “adhesive” mode than traditional
standard form agreements because there is no fine print on the
reverse side of a document that conceivably could be crossed out or
changed prior to signing. 65 As a general rule, courts interpret
adhesion contracts strictly against a commercial party seeking the
assent of a consumer, resulting in a kind of “super contra
proferentem.” In some cases the courts’ analysis outstrips the
boundaries of contra proferentem entirely, and results in decisions
that the terms of an adhesion contract simply will not be enforced
when they deviate from the reasonable expectations of the parties.
The modern “Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations” was
conceptualized by Robert Keeton to explain a number of insurance
coverage cases that otherwise lacked a coherent and consistent
Once articulated, a number of states actively
justification. 66
This makes choice of law provisions in click-wrap agreements even more important, as
demonstrated in Wilmot v. McNabb, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1209 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (finding
that the venue provision was unconscionable under California law, but noting that the
result would have been different under Colorado law).

64

Some cases suggest that click-wrap contracts are designed to discourage review of the
terms by the buyer. See Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in Electronic Contracting: Minimum
Standards for Non-Negotiated Contracts, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1041, 1043–45 (2005) (citing
Scarcella v. Am. Online, Inc., 2004 WL 2093429 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Sept. 8, 2004) as an
example). See sources cited supra note 26 that lend support to a criticism of courts that
are unwilling to assess the cognitive differences between a consumer signing a paper form
with boilerplate terms and that same consumer engaging in click-wrap contracting, and
that can be extended to a broader critique of the assumptions about commercial parties.
65

66 See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions: Part One,
83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970) (arguing that “[t]he objectively reasonable expectations
of the applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will
be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provision would have negated
those expectations”). Subsequent academic commentary on the Doctrine of Reasonable
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developed the Doctrine by expressly interpreting insurance policies in
a manner that could not be squared with the precise language of the
policy, effectively broadening the coverage afforded thereby. 67 These
courts openly acknowledged that the development of the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations was a necessary adjustment to fundamental
shifts in the formation of insurance contracts since the days when ship
owners and underwriters negotiated coverage in Lloyd’s Coffee
House. 68 However, there is nothing intrinsic to the Doctrine of
Expectations includes: Peter Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the
Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 729 (2000);
Symposium: The Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations After Three
Decades, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (1998); Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823 (1990); Mark C.
Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323 (1986); Kenneth S.
Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable
Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981).
As Kenneth Abraham has suggested, in addition to making insurance law, judges
sometimes make insurance. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL
THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 100–32 (1986).
67

68 See Zuckerman v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 650 P.2d 441 (Ariz. 1982), in which the court
made this point clearly:

Thus, if this were the ordinary contract, we would have no hesitation in
holding the parties to their agreement, providing the limitation period
was not so short as to be against public policy and that the terms of the
contract were not so unconscionable that unfair advantage was being
taken of the person in an inferior bargaining position. Whatever the
historic origin of the insurance contract, we cannot close our eyes to
present-day reality. An insurance agreement such as the ordinary fire
policy in issue here is not a contract arrived at by negotiation between
the parties. The insured is given no choice regarding terms and
conditions of coverage which are contained on forms which the insured
seldom sees before purchase of the policy, which often are difficult to
understand, and which usually are neither read nor expected to be read
by either the person who sells the policy or the person who buys it. This
is not the traditional method by which contracts, including insurance
contracts, have been made. The changes which have come into the
insurance business over the last 50 years reflect the industry’s
adjustment to modern business conditions and necessities. The rules
pertaining to the enforcement of the “bargain” made by the parties
evolved at a time when the parties negotiated an insurance contract;
they have little or no relevance to the present methods of transacting
most insurance business.
This principle is being increasingly
recognized by the courts.
Id. at 446 (internal citations omitted). See also Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 371 A.2d
193, 196 (Pa. 1977) (The court held that prior case law insisting on strict readings of
insurance contracts “fails to recognize the true nature of the relationship between
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Reasonable Expectations that limits its application only to the
insurance context or only to transactions between consumers and
large, sophisticated entities selling a complex product. 69 Indeed, the
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations grew out of a more general
doctrinal orientation that attempted to address core questions at the
heart of contract law regarding assent, and it represented a response
insurance companies and their insured. An insurance contract is not a negotiated
agreement; rather its conditions are by and large dictated by the insurance company to the
insured.”).
Courts have been reluctant even within the insurance setting to favor policyholders in
situations where the policyholder is sophisticated and heavily involved in the development
of the policy language. This trend suggests that it is not so much the nature of the
insurance business that drives the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations as the fact that
many insurance coverage cases present prototypical consumer adhesion contracts even if
the insured is a commercial entity. The “sophisticated insured” doctrine recognizes that in
some cases equally sophisticated parties have negotiated the policy terms. Compare E.
Associated Coal Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 632 F.2d 1068, 1075 (3d Cir. 1980)
(applying Pennsylvania law and declaring that “the principle that ambiguities in policies
should be strictly construed against the insurer does not control the situation where large
corporations, advised by counsel and having equal bargaining power, are the parties to a
negotiated policy.”), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981), and McNeilab, Inc. v. N. River Ins.
Co., 645 F. Supp. 525, 547 (D.N.J. 1986), aff’d, 831 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1987) (concluding
that contra proferentem could not be applied because the corporate insured was large,
sophisticated, and aided by counsel in negotiating the policy, which included fifteen
separate addenda), with Turner & Newall, P.L.C. v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 1985 WL 8056
(D.D.C. Aug. 1, 1985) (rejecting the interpretation of Eastern Associated and applying
contra proferentem in a case involving a commercial insured). The Turner Court
concluded:
69

After reviewing the cited authorities, the court finds that it is consistent
with general authority and Pennsylvania law to construe this provision
against the insurer if it is found to be ambiguous, because as the drafter
of the provision, the insurer should bear the risk that when a dispute
arises over precisely which stockholders are additional insureds and
under what circumstances, the insurer’s failure to be precise should not
inure to its benefit. Thus, the better rule, and the one followed in
Pennsylvania, is to construe against the drafter of an agreement by
virtue of its control over the words chosen.
Turner, 1985 WL 8056 at *4. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the
“Sophisticated” Policyholder Defense in Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REV.
807, 849–56 (1993) (surveying the cases and suggesting that commercial parties might still
receive the benefits of contra proferentem and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations,
but that the insured’s sophistication would be taken into account through a number of
factors such as whether the commercial party participated in the drafting of the policy
language and whether the party had access to a competitive market for the product and the
means to appreciate the different coverage terms offered); Swisher, supra note 66, at 737–
40.
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to dramatic changes in the manner in which policies were drafted for,
marketed to, and procured by, insureds. 70
Karl Llewellyn anticipated that something close to the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations would be a necessary response to the
breakdown of individualized contracting in the twentieth century with
the advent of standard form mass contracting. 71 Llewellyn did not
Protecting reasonable expectations is a central goal of our legal system, even if the
principle does not provide determinant guidance in particular cases. For a general
assessment of this principle, see Bailey H. Kuklin, The Justification for Protecting
Reasonable Expectations, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 863 (2001). Kuklin concludes that the
principle is “a powerful force driving the law” that occupies a “place near the pinnacle of
legal precepts,” but that it “works poorly as a spotlight when invoked to resolve close legal
issues.” Id. at 905. Thus, the principle will not provide sufficient guidance to resolve
specific cases, but it can provide a guiding norm in the case-by-case effort to police the
margins.
70

Some might argue that the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations is peculiarly suited to
consumer purchases of insurance, a setting in which it is only contract rights that are
purchased and these rights are all but incomprehensible to most purchasers. The aleatory
nature of the insurance relationship is a relevant difference, but one that imports no
overriding distinction. It may be true that a party that purchases goods wants the goods
and couldn’t care less about the boilerplate contract language, but it is equally true that a
party that purchases insurance wants to receive a cash payment when it suffers a loss and
doesn’t really care about the contract language. Nevertheless, it is true that there is an
important (and generally unacknowledged) distinction between insurance policies and
commercial contracts: public policy favors insurance coverage and courts are more willing
to impose contractual obligations on insurers who already operate in a heavily regulated
environment. Even this difference doesn’t undermine the application of the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations to commercial transactions as much as suggest that the contours
of applying this doctrine will be different in practice.
71 As Robert Jerry describes, Llewellyn was one of the first thinkers to address the problem
of adhesion contracts by suggesting something akin to the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations articulated by Keeton in 1970. Jerry discusses Alan Schwartz’s research:

which shows that Llewellyn had focused on the link between reasonable
expectations and standardization at least two decades before [Friedrich
Kessler’s seminal article in 1943]. In a 1925 article published in the
American Economic Review, Llewellyn recommended that courts read
contracts to contain what the weaker party would expect the contract to
contain, and he used the example of insurance contracts to make his
point. Specifically, he advocated giving “the insured . . . the protection
he might decently believe he was buying, without too close regard to the
exceptions of the policy.” In so many words, this was the Keeton
formulation of the reasonable expectations doctrine . . . .
. . . In his early sales scholarship, Llewellyn considered many of the
same issues with respect to standardized sales contracts that Keeton
considered with respect to insurance policies. Llewellyn urged in no
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view the Doctrine as an atavistic reaction against standard form
contracts; to the contrary, he viewed it as a necessary development to
support the widespread use of standard forms. In a book review
published in 1939, he emphasized that standardized forms met a “real
need,” but that “the presuppositions of our general law no longer
maintain in such a situation.” 72 In his characteristic prose style,
Llewellyn admitted that judicial competency is limited, but insisted
that common law judges are well suited to recognize that “where
bargaining is absent in fact, the conditions and clauses to be read into
a bargain are not those which happen to be printed on the unread
paper, but are those which a sane man might reasonably expect to find
on that paper.” 73 Admittedly, attention was focused on consumers
who should not be bound strictly to all of the terms of an adhesion
contract. However, it is important not to forget that Llewellyn was
equally concerned with businesses that suffered as a result of the
misguided application of classical contract law principles. As paper
uncertain terms that plain text in standardized sales contracts should
be given a meaning that a reasonable consumer would expect in the
circumstances. Kessler built upon these same points in his Columbia
Law Review article.
Almost fifty years after Llewellyn and
approximately twenty-five years after Kessler, Keeton found evidence
that courts were reaching exactly that conclusion in the decided
insurance cases under a wide range of doctrinal theories. These
common insights and shared principles should not surprise us; after all,
insurance policies are but one kind of standardized form.
Jerry, supra note 41, at 46–47.
The relative purity of Llewellyn’s vision was muddled in the long effort to secure adoption
of the Uniform Commercial Code, leading to the need to incorporate more express
acceptance of “freedom of contract” principles as understood by formalists in the 1950’s.
Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1949-1954,
49 BUFF. L. REV. 359 (2001). This is not to say that Article 2 was stripped of its
inventiveness entirely: “Even though the 1957 code was much chastened from what it
might have been had it been drafted during the 1930s, it was still viewed in some quarters
as ‘paternalistic’ and a ‘leftist’ attempt to reallocate wealth.” Curtis Nyquist, Llewellyn’s
Code as a Reflection of Legal Consciousness, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 419, 421 (2006); Allen
R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism, and the
Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALBANY L. REV. 325, 395 (1995). Moreover, even
if Article 2 was somewhat chastened, Llewellyn was not. As described in the following text,
Llewellyn held firm to his initial intuitions about standard form contracts.
K. N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 700–01 (1939) (reviewing O.
PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND
CONTINENTAL LAW (1937)).
72

73

Id. at 704.
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standardized forms came into widespread use, the problem
confronting businesses was the incompatibility of their battling forms.
Llewellyn’s statutory innovation to protect businesses engaged in the
battle of the forms was § 2-207, which ensured both that a contract
was recognized and that one party would not succeed in having all of
its terms enforced. The solution provided by § 2-207 made direct
judicial enforcement of the parties’ reasonable expectations
unnecessary because § 2-207 empowered commercial parties to utilize
competing standard forms as force-fields that effectively protected
their reasonable expectations.
Near the end of his career, Llewellyn offered his much-cited, but
too infrequently examined, thesis of “blanket assent” to ensure the
protection of reasonable expectations. In his magisterial book, The
Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals, Llewellyn discusses the
problem created by enforcing standard form contracts in the course of
explaining how judges and scholars work to adjust the law to changing
social circumstances. 74 Llewellyn first acknowledges that standard
form contracts play a vital role in a modern economy. 75 Indeed, he
goes so far as to suggest that standard form agreements that emerge
from balanced negotiations within an industry should be enforced by
courts in recognition that these form agreements provide “the road to
better than official-legal regulation of our economic life; indeed, they
tend to lead into the setting up of their own quick, cheap, expert
tribunals.” 76 Llewellyn was an economic realist who understood the
need for order and dependability in a well-functioning commercial
market.
But Llewellyn also understood that the private power conferred on
commercial parties by classical contract doctrine could be abused to
the detriment of those people who assume that they are placing their
heads in the mouth of a “sweet and gentle lion.” 77 Llewellyn noted
Llewellyn argues that boilerplate agreements are an example of how “the clan of legal
scholars and the tribe of appellate judges are allies willy-nilly in the Herculean labor of
producing and expanding order in our legal doctrine . . . .” LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at
361–62.

74

Llewellyn suggests that form agreements with sweeping clauses protect businesses from
excessive risks (he cites the problem of the seed company defending itself in front of a jury
of farmers in a case involving a farmer’s loss of an entire crop) and suggests that it might
make sense simply to bar all claims so as to permit a fair-minded company to create
exceptions for contracting partners who raise meritorious claims. Id. at 363.

75

76

Id.

77

Llewellyn captures the situation in his familiar prose style:
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that broad clauses in the drafter’s favor are sometimes written in a
manner that confers too much discretion, which is problematic for the
simple reason that not all companies are gentle lions, and even sweet
lions can make mistakes sometimes. 78 The classical common law
courts approached the problem in a wholly unrealistic manner,
Llewellyn argued, because they unpredictably read the form
agreement literally, in a bow to freedom of contract, and then later in
their analysis they unpredictably refused to enforce terms they
deemed to be “indecent.” 79 Citing Dawson’s comparative analysis of
the German system, and his own book review of a text on English and
continental law, Llewellyn argued that scholars were only beginning to
point the way to a realistic approach to standard form agreements. 80
Llewellyn’s famous response to the challenge presented by
standard form agreements was to recognize that assent had become a
two-tiered reality. When a party is presented with a standard form
agreement:
[T]he boiler-plate is assented to en bloc, “unsight, unseen,”
on the implicit assumption and to the full extent that (1) it
does not alter or impair the fair meaning of the dickered
terms when read alone, and (2) that its terms are neither in
the particular nor in the net manifestly unreasonable and
unfair. Such is the reality, and I see nothing in the way of a
court’s operating on that basis, to truly effectuate the only
intention which can in reason be worked out as common to
the two parties, granted good faith. And if the boiler-plate
party is not playing in good faith, there is law enough to bar
that fact from benefiting it. We had a hundred years of sales
law in which any sales transaction with explicit words
Power, like greed, if it does not always corrupt, goes easily to the head.
So that form-agreements tend either at once or over the years, and often
by whole lines of trade, into a massive and almost terrifying jughandled character; the one party lays his head into the mouth of a lion–
either, and mostly, without reading the fine print, or occasionally in
hope and expectation (not infrequently solid) that it will be a sweet and
gentle lion.
Id. at 362.
78

Id. at 362.

79

Id. at 364–65.

80

Id. at 365–66.
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resulted in two several contracts for the one consideration:
that of sale, and the collateral one of warranty. The idea is
applicable here, for better reason: any contract with boilerplate results in two several contracts: the dickered deal, and
the collateral one of supplementary boilerplate. Rooted in
sense, history, and simplicity, it is an answer which could
occur to anyone. 81

Llewellyn argued that commentators and courts would converge on
the theory of blanket assent as the best interpretation of contract law
in light of modern economic conditions. 82

81

Id. at 371. As one commentator explains,
[Llewellyn’s] theory provides both a rationale for upholding most
standard-form contracts–at least insofar as they are not unreasonable
or indecent–and also an understanding of what is actually going on in
the customer’s mind. . . . If the term is central to the agreement—a
dickered or negotiated term in Llewellyn’s parlance—then it will be
given wide deference. On the other hand where the terms are not
negotiated and are peripheral to the basic agreement, then, in fairness,
the court should take a closer look, if only because the imbalance of
power between the parties means that the term will, in all likelihood,
have been drafted in a manner most favorable to the drafting party. If
so, and the resulting term is either ‘unreasonable’ or ‘indecent,’ the
court can find that there was no actual assent and refuse to enforce the
term. The court, through this kind of scrutiny, can ensure that the
overall contract remains balanced.

Oakley, supra note 65, at 1054–55.
82 Llewellyn noted that the theory of blanket assent would not protect a party who has read
and expressly manifested assent to an indecent clause, but he suggested that these rare
cases could be handled by a bit of slight-of-hand.

The one case in a thousand where the dirty clauses have been read and
truly agreed to can, for my money, be discarded both as de minimus
and to keep that issue from disturbing all the litigation to which it is in
fact irrelevant. The common law technique, when the facts run so
profusely in a single direction, would be a simple “conclusive
presumption”–that boiler-plate has not been read.
LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 391. Llewellyn’s uncharacteristic use of a “covert tool” may
have been a prescient suggestion for how to deal with the increasingly specific means by
which click-through agreements are reached, such as requiring the party to check
individual paragraphs, to scroll through the entire list of terms before clicking “I agree,”
etc.
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As we transition to a single electronic form with terms that are
present only virtually, the time is ripe to consider whether some form
of the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations makes sense even in nonconsumer contexts. To borrow Professor Jerry’s phrase, to do so
would be to launch a major offensive in the battle for the soul of
contract law. 83 Admittedly, this assault might prove to be the Pickett’s
Charge of legal functionalism, resulting in a decisive victory for
formalists. But, this may be the best and most honest response to the
looming irrelevance of § 2-207.
It is important to emphasize that I am arguing in favor of judicial
efforts to police the margins of contracting by commercial parties by
reinvigorating the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations. The failed
effort to amend Article 2 has many facets, but certainly the initial draft
83

Jerry’s prose is worth quoting at length:
Throughout most of the twentieth century, courts and scholars have
battled for the soul of contract law. On one side are the formalists or
classicists, whose champions are Professor Williston and the first
Restatement of Contracts. The formalists care mightily about texts and
the four corners of documents. . . .
...
The other contestants in the battle for the soul of contract law are the
functionalists, who are sometimes also labeled as the progressives, the
realists, or the post-classicists. The champions of this side are Professor
Corbin and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. . . . Where a form is
standardized, the functionalists substitute objectively reasonable
expectations for whatever the particular recipient of the form
understood, given that the recipient has less reason to know what the
drafter means, while the drafter has insights into what the ordinary,
reasonable recipient of the form is likely to understand. In the
functionalists’ world, Judge Keeton’s doctrine of reasonable
expectations is far from threatening. Indeed insurance law’s doctrine of
reasonable expectation simply restates for insurance lawyers what
contract law is (or should be) saying to all lawyers.
...
This means that Judge Keeton’s article is not just about insurance law;
it speaks to consumers and businesses in any industry where
standardized forms are used. Thus, the debate over reasonable
expectations is not just an insurance law debate. It is a contract law
debate, and the prize to the winner is ownership of a major piece of the
soul of contract law.

Jerry, supra note 41, at 55–56.
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providing consumer protection modeled on the doctrine of reasonable
expectations was controversial and drew the ire of industry. As
Braucher advises, this experience suggests that uniform regulatory
approaches to this problem are not likely to succeed politically and, in
fact, may be counterproductive in light of the need for
experimentation and attention to context. 84 Even if large consumer

84

Braucher writes:
An obvious way to attempt to reduce political objection to special
policing of SFKs [standard form contracts] is to limit the category to
which heightened policing applies. Limitations to consumer contracts
. . . is the narrowest strategy of this type, but even that focus has proved
controversial in the UCC revision process. For example, the Article 2
revision project initially undertook to make a version of the common
law “reasonable expectations” doctrine (making terms contrary to
reasonable expectations unenforceable) explicitly applicable to sales of
goods to consumers. However, even with a narrow focus on consumer
contracts, the effort was beaten back and eventually abandoned by the
Article 2 drafting committee. In the face of political deadlock in the
uniform laws process, it may be time to think about nonuniform state
law as a vehicle to begin experimentation with new and more effective
methods of policing SFKS.

Braucher, supra note 27, at 417–18.
The original Reporter for the Article 2 revision process, Richard Speidel, describes how
strong sellers “beat back” the attempt to expressly include the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations on behalf of consumers by convincing the NCCUSL leadership that they
would block enactment of Revised Article 2. Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A
View From the Trenches, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 607, 610 (2001). He suggests that the reason
the original draft was “hung out to dry” leaving “protection for consumers and small
businesses . . . to section 2-302 and the comments,” was that the “strong sellers” were
content with existing Article 2: “Limited only by the porous doctrines of unconscionability
and good faith, strong sellers are able to shape the contract to fit their interests,
particularly where small business and consumers were involved.” Id. at 616, 618.
All this leads me to conclude that the courts, whatever their drawbacks, will have to
provide the solution to problems that arise after the battle of the forms has ended.
Uniform regulation is now all but unthinkable, and state-by-state regulatory reform is
certain to confront the same unified opposition that stymied efforts to revise Article 2.
Clayton Gillette’s recent hypothesis that protecting consumers from abusive rolling
contracts is best accomplished not by relying solely on market constraints, but also by ex
ante supervision of contract terms by regulators and ex post regulation by courts, while
carefully argued and fairly noting the advantages and disadvantages of each mechanism,
would seem to be unrealistic in the present environment. See Gillette, supra note 36, at
722 (admitting that no third-party “agent” will be a perfect surrogate for the contracting
party, but arguing that a judicious mix of all three mechanisms is probably desirable).
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goods manufacturers were justified in their fear that statutory
recognition of the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations on behalf of
consumers would amount to a formless and unpredictable rule, 85 the

In contrast, Robert Oakley concludes that courts currently apply an unconscionability
standard that is more demanding than Llewellyn’s test and that the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations holds no great promise outside the context of insurance law, Oakley, supra
note 65, at 1056, 1065 but his suggestion that consumer protection legislation be enacted
based on the E.U. Directive on Unfair Contract Terms (Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5
April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts) and the “Stop Before You Click”
principles developed by the Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions with
respect to the licensing of computer information, id. at 1065–71, 1071–1100, appears even
more unlikely to address the problem.
Perhaps well-defined rules for the consumer sector might be successfully enacted in some
states (e.g., you can’t require a consumer to arbitrate a $500 dispute in a distant locale),
but any such reforms will almost certainly not extend to the commercial parties that are the
focus of this article.
In early drafts of Revised Article 2, the drafting committee incorporated the Reasonable
Expectations Doctrine to deal with standard form contracts presented to consumers. The
draft presented for discussion at the NCCUSL 1996 Annual Meeting included the following:

85

SECTION 2-206. STANDARD FORM RECORDS.
(a) If all of the terms of a contract are contained in a record which is a
standard form or contains standard terms and the party who did not
prepare the record manifests assent to it by a signature or other
conduct, that party adopts all terms contained in record as part of the
contract except those terms that are unconscionable.
(b) A term in a record which is a standard form or which contains
standard terms to which a consumer has manifested assent by a
signature or other conduct is not part of the contract if the consumer
could not reasonably have expected it unless the consumer expressly
agrees to the term. In determining whether a term is part of the
contract, the court shall consider the content, language, and
presentation of the standard form or standard term.
(c) A term adopted under subsection (a) becomes part of the contract
without regard to the knowledge or understanding of individual terms
by the party assenting to the standard form record, whether or not the
party read the form.
Uniform Commercial Code, National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws,
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/ucc2sale.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2008). This
approach was altered substantially. The March 1, 1999, draft of Revised Article 2 read as
follows:
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situation is different when considering transactions between
businesses that were formerly concluded with a battle of forms. In
commercial transactions, there are more well-defined notions of
unacceptable business contracting practices that can inform the
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations as a means for policing the
fringes. 86 In defending the notion of “blanket assent,” Llewellyn
admitted that a statutory solution to the problem of policing terms is
“likely to be both awkward in manner and deficient or spotty in
scope” 87 ; for this reason judicial enforcement of reasonable
expectations provides the best mechanism for adjusting the law to
modern social and economic reality, at least in the first instance. 88 In
SECTION 2-206.
CONTRACTS.

UNENFORCEABLE

TERMS

IN

CONSUMER

(a) In a consumer contract, a court may refuse to enforce a standard
term in a record the inclusion of which was materially inconsistent with
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in contracts of that
type, or, subject to Section 2-202, conflicts with one or more
nonstandard terms in the record.
(b) If it is claimed or appears to the court that any term of a consumer
contract may be unenforceable, the parties, to aid the court in making
the determination, must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence as to the term’s commercial setting, purpose, and
effect or as to whether it was consistent with reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in contracts of that type.
(c) This section does not apply to a term disclaiming or modifying an
implied warranty that complies with Section 2-406.
Revision of Uniform Commercial Code Article 2–Sales, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/
ucc2399.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2008). Ultimately, as finally adopted, Amended Article 2
contains no element of consumer protection specifically with regard to standard form
agreements.
86 Article 2 is built on this assumption, with “reasonable commercial practices” providing
much of the guidance in the statutory provisions. Although we might debate the extent to
which trade usage is sufficiently definite to provide terms of the parties’ contract, there is
far more likelihood that business mores, as revealed through expert testimony and careful
attention to the facts of the case, will sufficiently identify extreme, unacceptable
contracting behavior on the fringes of commercial practice.
87

LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 370.

88 Llewellyn’s famous lectures in German on the case law system in America discuss the
how the interaction of case law precedent and the formulation of statutes can be
maximized:
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the remainder of this article, I analyze how courts can utilize the
existing Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations for the limited purpose
of ensuring that commercial contracting retains its integrity after the
demise of the battle of the forms.

1. THE DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations is embodied in § 211 of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which pertains to the
interpretation of standard form contracts generally, and is not limited
to consumer contexts. 89 Indeed, Restatement § 211 reflects the

At the [start of developing new law], both the insight and experience
necessary to create a statute are lacking. A statute passed under such
circumstances is a far greater misfortune than any misstep taken by a
case law court. But if enough cases are available, if enough experience
has been amassed to make an incisive diagnosis possible, a statute can
more much more directly and efficiently toward its real goal than the
pure tradition-bound case law method. Once a statute is adopted,
though, there is room again for the case law method, for only through it
can legislative insight be elaborated, corrected, and perfected in light of
the subsequent, unforeseen cases. Optimally, a statute will create a new
goal and a new means to achieve it, but never the ultimate
particularized solution which is finally achieved—knowingly or
unknowingly, admitted or kept under wraps—only through judicial
decision.
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 67 (Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael Ansaldi
trans., 1989) (1933). Given the inability to craft a satisfactory uniform law solution to the
problem, Llewellyn would undoubtedly urge courts to develop case law that could serve as
the resource for an eventual statutory scheme. This appears to be the path followed by the
German courts and legislature. See infra notes 116–21 and accompanying text.
89

The provision reads as follows:
§ 211. Standardized Agreements
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement
signs or otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to
believe that like writings are regularly used to embody terms of
agreements of the same type, he adopts the writing as an integrated
agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing.
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike
all those similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or
understanding of the standard terms of the writing.
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broader principle broached by Llewellyn, and then developed
principally in the insurance context. 90 Section 211 provides a
relatively simple framework for effectuating the terms of a form
agreement. A party is bound to the terms of a standard form when it
manifests assent with the knowledge that such a form regularly
embodies terms of the agreement, but the terms are interpreted in an
objective manner (“treating alike all those similarly situated, without
regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms”). 91
However, the reasonable expectations of the party assenting to the
form may trump the terms as written when the offering party “has
reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do
so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term.” 92 This
carefully worded exception ensures that the reasonable expectations
of both parties are honored. Comment (f) provides the rationale for
this rule:
Although customers typically adhere to standardized
agreements and are bound by them without even appearing
to know the standard terms in detail, they are not bound to
unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party
manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing
contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1980). Recent cases applying Restatement
§ 211 in non-insurance disputes include: Harrington v. Pulte Home Corp., 119 P.3d 1044,
1048 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that an arbitration clause in a home construction
contract did not violate reasonable expectations); Broemmer v. Abortion Serv. of Phoenix,
Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Ariz. 1992) (holding that an arbitration clause was not
enforceable in a case involving physical injury, where the patient, in a state of emotional
upset, signed a contract containing an arbitration clause requiring that a doctor of the
same specialty as the defendant serve as the arbitrator); and cases cited in note 93, infra.
90 See Friedman, supra note 12, at 41 (characterizing § 211 as embodying Llewellyn’s
approach). Llewellyn expressly drew from the same insurance cases that formed the basis
of Keeton’s article, arguing that the theory of blanket assent was used by courts in
situations where the fine print followed the contracting (such as the purchase of an
insurance policy), but that the theory was equally applicable to all form agreements.
LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 370.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(1), (2). This rule recognizes that the point
of a standard form is that it is not intended to be read, but rather is accepted by parties that
“trust to the good faith of the party using the form and to the tacit representation that like
terms are being accepted regularly by others similarly situated.” Id. at cmt. b.

91

92

Id. § 211(3).

326

I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

[Vol. 4:2

expectation. [The offering party’s reason to believe that the
term would not be acceptable] may be shown by the prior
negotiations or inferred from the fact that the term is bizarre
or oppressive, from the fact that it eviscerates the nonstandard terms explicitly agreed to, or from the fact that it
eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction. The
inference is reinforced if the adhering party never had an
opportunity to read the term, or if it is illegible or otherwise
hidden from view. 93

This rule and rationale provide a reasoned and balanced starting point
for developing a solution to the problems that might arise between
commercial parties who have executed contracts in a click-wrap
world.
It is important to emphasize that the use of the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations in connection with click-wrap adhesion
contracts does not mean that a party can easily trump terms to which
it ostensibly has manifested agreement. Under the formulation of
Restatement § 211, terms contained in a standardized form to which
assent has formally been expressed by clicking “I agree” shall be
interpreted objectively, and will govern the transaction unless the
offering party “has reason to believe that the party manifesting such
assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a
particular term.” 94 However, attempting to restrict the scope of the
Doctrine by permitting courts to override a term only when it is so
93 Id. § 211, cmt. f. Some states use a version of this language to flesh out the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations in insurance coverage cases. A leading case, C&J Fertilizer, Inc.
v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W. 2d 169, 174–76 (Iowa 1975) (en banc), expressly drew
from Llewellyn’s notion of blanket assent and comment f to Restatement § 211 to formulate
a general rule respecting reasonable expectations that could be applied to the insurance
policy in question. See also Clark-Peterson Co. v. Ind. Ins. Assoc., 492 N.W.2d 675, 677
(Iowa 1992) (en banc):

Originating with Rodman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 208 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Iowa 1973), the doctrine has become a vital
part of our law interpreting insurance policies. But the doctrine does
not contemplate the expansion of insurance coverage on a general
equitable basis. The doctrine is carefully circumscribed; it can only be
invoked where an exclusion “(1) is bizarre or oppressive, (2) eviscerates
terms explicitly agreed to, or (3) eliminates the dominant purpose of the
transaction.” Aid (Mut.) Ins. v. Steffen, 423 N.W.2d 189, 192 (Iowa
1988); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d 104, 112
(Iowa 1981).
94

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 211 (3).
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odious that the courts can conclude counter-factually that the
customer would have withheld assent altogether had it known about
the term provides only a veneer of restraint and objectivity.
Courts are likely to find that adjudication is more predictable if
they articulate the Doctrine based on the underlying principles, rather
than a pretense of counter-factual analysis. Stated in a more
forthright and realistic manner, a commercial party should be able to
seek relief from the literal terms of a standard form click-wrap
agreement only when the term in question is objectively surprising to
that party in circumstances where the seller should have known that
the term would not be acceptable. 95 The fact that the party seeking
relief is a commercial party rather than a consumer should be relevant
to determining which expectations are “reasonable,” but the nonconsumer nature of the transaction should not preclude the
application of the Doctrine. 96
With reference to consumer contracts, Russell Korobkin has recently argued that the
formulation of Restatement § 211 is not helpful because it is at once too demanding (by
focusing on truly outrageous terms that undermine assent altogether) and too lenient (by
focusing on the circumstances of the individual buyer rather adopting a more objective
analysis of the class of similarly situated buyers). Korobkin, supra note 26, at 1270.
Korobkin suggests that the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations would be better suited to
the task, but concludes that it has fallen into desuetude outside the insurance coverage
context. Id. at 1270–71. Korobkin responds by reconceptualizing the unconscionability
defense to deal with the effects of bounded rationality on consumer transactions involving
standard form agreements, id. at 1278–90, but that is not a plausible strategy for the
commercial sphere. Thus, in this article I attempt to articulate how the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations can be resuscitated in the context of commercial transactions
concluded by electronic means.

95

In recent years, some courts have used the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations as an
interpretive principle to protect consumers from over-reaching literalist interpretations of
standard-form contract language by preventing credit card companies from adding
arbitration agreements to the governing terms and conditions pursuant to a broad clause
in the original agreement that purports to permit the company to amend the agreement
after providing notice of the change and an opportunity to opt out. See Perry v.
FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 2004 WL 1508518 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2004) (holding that a card
issuer’s attempt to add an arbitration clause to the terms of use by invoking a clause that
permitted modification by the card issuer was contrary to the card holder’s reasonable
expectations); Stone v. Golden Wexler & Sarnese, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 189, 194 (E.D.N.Y.
2004) (same); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Avery, 593 S.E.2d 424, 432 (N.C. App. 2004)
(applying Arizona law) (“A customer would not expect that a major corporation could
choose to disregard potential contractual opportunities and then later, if it changed its
mind, impose them on the customer unilaterally.”); Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 273, 284 (Cal. App. 1998) (deciding the matter on principles of contract
interpretation). It stands to reason that a small business using a corporate credit card
might successfully make a similar argument under certain circumstances, whereas a huge
corporation that annually negotiates its corporate credit card agreement might not. The
question should not be decided solely on the basis of the party’s status as a commercial
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If our hypothetical tennis entrepreneur finds that her click-wrap
agreement to purchase goods from a manufacturer eviscerates her
ability to seek redress for breach through a series of provisions
regarding mandatory notice of claims, an inconvenient venue for
pursuing claims, and a mandatory arbitration process that renders
seeking relief pointless, it is entirely appropriate that a court consider
whether the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations should provide
some manner of relief. Having lost the ability to deploy the § 2-207
force-field, and in response to a contracting process that intensifies
the adhesive character of the transaction to new levels, the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations can provide a balanced and context-sensitive
means for courts to ensure the integrity of the contract as the “bargain
in fact” of the parties, rather than as a formalistic concealed weapon
that can be unsheathed abruptly by the superior party. 97
entity, but rather with regard for the reasonable expectations of the parties to the
commercial contract.
Of course, even consumers would be bound to arbitrate disputes pursuant to an
amendment to their credit card agreement under circumstances that suggest that this type
of amendment was to be reasonably expected, or that the amendment process more closely
conforms to a genuine bilateral modification. The court cases mentioned above will likely
reinforce contracting practices that are not overreaching and that courts will be inclined to
find enforceable. See, e.g., Beneficial Nat. Bank, U.S.A. v. Payton, 214 F. Supp. 2d 679, 687
(S.D. Miss. 2001) (distinguishing Badie because cardholder was given the opportunity to
reject the proposed amendment providing for arbitration of disputes and to continue with
the current agreement); Bank One, N.A. v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 829 (S.D. Miss.
2001) (same).
This analysis can be rendered more sophisticated by drawing back from the individual
contract and considering the effect of the arbitration clause when it precludes a class action
in situations where a class action is the only viable means of imposing ex post
accountability. See Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73
U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 173 (2006) (“Every indication is that the imposed arbitration clauses
are nothing but a shield against legal accountability by the credit card companies.”). It is
not a stretch to suggest that parties have a reasonable expectation that there will be some
plausible method to assert a claim, and so an arbitration clause designed in part to
preclude effective review would properly be subject to judicial scrutiny. In the consumer
setting the doctrine of unconscionability provides courts with an additional tool with which
to reinforce reasonable expectations, especially under the broader rule in California. Id. at
178–80 (discussing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76, 85–86 (Cal.
2005)); see also Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003); Acorn v. Household
Int’l, Inc. 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 862, 868 (Cal. App. 2002).
Article 1 defines “agreement” as the “bargain in fact of the parties,” reflecting the
jurisprudence of legal realism that pervades the jurisprudence of Article 2. U.C.C. § 1201(a)(3) (2006).

97
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Consider a more detailed exploration of this hypothetical. Assume
that the tennis entrepreneur electronically orders ten racquets from a
manufacturer that has production and distribution facilities around
the world. The click-wrap contract contains a number of terms,
including a non-disparagement clause and a dispute resolution
provision that obligates the buyer to arbitrate any disputes in
Switzerland (the location of the manufacturer’s world headquarters)
under the ICC rules, although the seller retains its right to summary
process and repossession in the event of nonpayment. We can assume
that the seller has selected these terms in the rational pursuit of its
business objectives rather than for the purpose of causing harm to its
buyers. We can also assume that the court would find that the
electronic contract is valid and binding. With respect to the specific
terms, the doctrine of unconscionability would almost certainly have
no application to this commercial contract. The question is whether
courts should be empowered to enforce the agreement without
enforcing some of the specific terms.
The non-disparagement clause would be construed within the
commercial setting, including the business purposes served by the
clause and its effect on the buyer. It might be perfectly reasonable for
all commercial purchasers to expect that they would become agents of
the manufacturer in dealing with consumers, and that it is reasonable
to expect that their business relationship is founded on the buyer’s
express commitment to endorse the seller’s products. The test of
reasonable expectations—whether the term in question is objectively
surprising to the buyer in circumstances where the seller should have
known that the term would not be acceptable—would necessarily be
fact-intensive, but also objective in character. It is helpful to analogize
to the merchant definition of Article 2 to clarify the “objective”
character of the analysis. Parties are treated as merchants under
Article 2 because they hold themselves out to the world as having
particular knowledge or skill (whether by dealing in the goods or
otherwise), not because they actually have specialized knowledge or
skill. 98 In analogous fashion, the tennis entrepreneur may honestly be
surprised to discover the full contours of the business context in which

Article 2 defines “merchant” as “a person, that deals in goods of the kind or otherwise
holds itself out by occupation as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or
goods involved in the transaction . . .” thereby making clear that dealing in goods is only
one way to hold oneself out to the world as a merchant. U.C.C. § 2-104 (1) (2000). The
functional, rather than ontological, character of the definition is reinforced by subsection
(3), which provides that a contract is between merchants when “both parties are chargeable
with the knowledge or skill of merchants.” U.C.C. § 2-104 (3) (2000).

98
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she is dealing, but this fact alone would not be the basis for avoiding
the import of contract terms to which she nominally assented by clickwrap contracting.
On the other hand, a dispute resolution provision that can be
shown to preclude any effective remedy for breach in virtually every
likely scenario that might arise between the parties should be highly
suspect. The seller might have ample justification for the provision
based on numerous contracts with large, multinational purchasers,
but this justification does not apply in the context of the class of buyer
in this hypothetical. One would expect that in virtually all cases of a
dispute regarding ten racquets, the seller would resolve the dispute
informally or at least would not insist on enforcing patently unrealistic
and unfair terms to govern a formal resolution of the dispute.
To the extent that the seller sought to enforce the dispute
resolution term as written, a court might find good reason to conclude
that the term in question is objectively surprising to the buyer in
circumstances where the seller should have known that the term
would not be acceptable. This result would not necessarily introduce
unacceptable uncertainty into the contractual relationship. If the
seller wishes to reduce uncertainty about such matters, it can easily
calibrate its dispute resolution term to avoid objectively unreasonable
features. For example, by providing different procedures and a
different venue according to the amount in controversy, a seller could
offer an objectively reasonable dispute resolution term that would be
enforced as written. Surely it is not asking too much for a seller to
offer a different approach to dispute resolution to a small buyer
claiming $150 in damages than it would offer to a large buyer that
claims $1 million in damages.
Determining whether a term was reasonably expected by the
parties in light of the commercial circumstances does not require the
court to undertake an inquiry that differs radically from the rule under
§ 2-207(2), which requires the determination of the terms of an
agreement when there is a battle of the forms. If commercial parties
exchange nonidentical forms to conclude or confirm an agreement,
terms that appear on only one of the forms become part of the
agreement unless, among other criteria, “they materially alter” the
The Official Comments make clear that this
agreement. 99
determination amounts to an inquiry into the objective reasonable
expectations of the parties by suggesting that the rule seeks to
determine whether the additional terms would “result in surprise or

99

U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (2000).
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hardship if incorporated without express awareness,” or they “involve
no element of unreasonable surprise.” 100 This is not to suggest that
courts should apply this precise test to a single form in the electronic
environment, but rather to emphasize that courts currently are bound
to make judgments about the reasonable expectations of commercial
parties engaged in a battle of the forms.

2. ANSWERING OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE
OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
Critics generally will argue that applying the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations to sales of goods will undermine the offering
party’s ability to proceed with confidence on the basis of its desired
terms and conditions, but this criticism misses the point that the very
nature of a claim under the Doctrine is that the offering party had no
reasonable basis to assume that its offered terms would be genuinely
accepted by the other party. A party that is advised by its lawyer that
the standard terms in its form agreement should eviscerate the other
party’s right to seek redress for breach of other terms of the agreement
has no legitimate basis for disappointment if the courts refuse to
enforce these terms. In the far more likely scenario where the offering
party has only a vague notion that its lawyer has drafted highly
favorable terms to protect it in the event of a dispute, this party suffers
no harm if a court construes the form to be enforceable only along
lines that more closely resemble what reasonable commercial parties
might expect if the agreement had been fully negotiated. 101
100

U.C.C. § 2-207, cmts. 4, 5 (2000).

101 Commentators have argued that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct are too
permissive in these contexts, essentially permitting lawyers to draft oppressive clauses on
behalf of their clients. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 361 (2002). Carrington opens his article with a strong statement:

Lawyers writing standard form contracts for clients to use in recording
transactions with parties not represented by counsel have a professional
duty to restrain their zeal. It is my impression that many lawyers are
unaware of such a duty. As a consequence, many cause injustice and
expose themselves and their firms not only to such appropriate moral
sanctions as the contempt of fellow citizens and other lawyers, but also
to some risks of tort liability and professional discipline.
Id. at 361. But Carrington ultimately concludes with regret that “no language in the text of
the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct appears explicitly to authorize professional
discipline on lawyers who write unconscionable contracts.” Id. at 380.
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The critique might be sharpened and refined, with critics insisting
that the very essence of standard form agreements is to ensure
certainty regarding the enforceable rights and obligations of both
parties across a wide variety of transaction partners. Because it is
impossible for the offering party to conduct a fact-specific inquiry
(even of objective elements) ex ante without eliminating the
efficiencies of the standard terms, the offering party cannot know
whether its standard terms will be enforceable in a given transaction.
Returning to the hypothetical, critics would argue that a tennis
racquet manufacturer that deals both with large wholesalers and small
resellers will be subjected to an uncertain application of its click-wrap
terms if courts are empowered to find that some of the terms are
enforceable with respect to the former but not the latter. However,
this critique remains unpersuasive.
First, it is important to reemphasize the objective nature of the
inquiry under the Doctrine, which means that it would be relatively
easy for the party to calibrate its terms to relevant objective factors so
as to achieve a higher degree of certainty. Moreover, the offering
party could present different standard terms to different classes of
buyers by using different web applications. This already occurs when
sellers seek to differentiate consumer orders from commercial orders
by utilizing different web interfaces, including restricted access
intranet pages. Large commercial buyers might pre-register to gain
access to a non-Internet-based application that would have
corresponding terms for the particular class of buyer. Of course, if
critics are concerned that the offering party will not be able to secure
all of the terms it desires in all of its transactions, this is just to return
to the debate over the soul of contract: the entire point of the Doctrine
of Reasonable Expectations is to deny the ability of one commercial
party to secure enforcement of all manner of terms it desires against
another commercial party, unless that party secures genuine assent.

A recent article argues that the anti-fraud provisions of Rules 1.2, 4.1 and 8.4 permit a
more robust restatement of the obligations imposed on lawyers drafting form agreements,
concluding that these rules “provide a powerful set of proscriptions against lawyers who
intentionally draft or negotiate invalid clauses, fail to advise a client of an invalid or iffy
clause, or misrepresent the validity of a clause to a client or another party or person. Rule
2.1 furnishes some compelling reasons why lawyers should counsel their clients more
broadly than on legal considerations alone. These rules, however, do not prevent a lawyer
from skillfully drafting a clause that is ‘close to the edge, but not over,’ as long as the lawyer
has a good-faith argument as to the clause’s validity, supported by a good-faith belief. ”
Christina L. Kunz, The Ethics of Invalid and “Iffy” Contract Clauses, 40 LOYOLA L.A. L.
REV. 487, 510 (2006).
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It is important to emphasize that when a commercial party enters
into a contract with knowledge of the terms and their implications, the
court should enforce those terms and the Doctrine will have no
relevance.
In their study of contracts between automobile
manufacturers and tier-1 suppliers, Omri Ben-Shahar and James J.
White describe the harsh, one-sided terms (including unilateral
termination clauses that are essentially unrestricted) that the
suppliers are required to accept in order to do business with the
manufacturers. 102 These standard terms are nonnegotiable, relatively
long-standing, and understood by the suppliers; consequently, they
should be enforced except in extreme (and extremely unlikely)
circumstances that would probably best be characterized as bad faith
enforcement of an otherwise legitimate contract right.
The
manufacturers do not permit a “battle of the forms” that would vary
their standard terms; instead, they insist on an express agreement to
their one-sided standard terms. 103
In such (unusual) circumstances, the use of electronic contracting
would not change the analysis. Just as a party today may avoid the
“reasonable expectations” rule of § 2-207 by insisting on an express
agreement to all of its one-sided terms, a party would be able to secure
actual assent to all of its terms in the electronic contracting
environment. My point is that courts are wrong to conclude that
simply utilizing click-wrap contracting allows the parties to reach this
result. The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations should fill the gap
left after the battle of the forms has ended; however, this does not
mean that the Doctrine should supplant genuine express agreements
to standard terms, even if they are one-sided.
This line of reasoning invites us to return to the starting, and
sticking, point. The thesis of this article is that when a commercial
party clicks “I agree,” it is not necessarily equivalent to the tier-1
manufacturer agreeing to General Motor’s well-known and
understood standard terms. Put plainly, it is a mistake to conclude
that the elimination of the battle of the forms in electronic contracting
is equivalent to the insistence of General Motors that it receive its
standard terms by refusing to engage in the battle of the forms. The
technology of electronic assent reflects greater degrees of organization
and efficiency, but does not always reflect a higher degree of actual
assent. The literature regarding consumer transactions suggests that
Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto
Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2006).

102

103

Id. at 967–68.
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assent is actually weakened in the electronic environment. 104 It
stands to reason that, if true, this dynamic would also hold true at
least for some commercial parties such as the tennis entrepreneur.
The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations might be difficult to deploy
in consumer settings, and may be largely duplicative of other doctrinal
and statutory protections, but the Doctrine can be deployed in a
predictable manner in the commercial setting to fill the void as
§ 2-207 becomes irrelevant. This approach would also forestall any
tendency of courts to question the “blanket assent” reflected in the
electronic contracting process as the means for policing unacceptable
terms. In this sense, the Doctrine would ensure recognition of the
existence of a bargain and thereby facilitate electronic contracting.
Courts should employ the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations as
a feature of general contract law that reaffirms the principles
underlying the recognition and enforcement of consensual
obligations.
The Supreme Court of Arizona, sitting en banc,
responded to the then newly drafted Restatement (Second) of
Contracts by emphasizing that developing the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations as a general feature of contract law, rather than solely as
a safety valve to benefit insurance policyholders, simultaneously
ensures the integrity of the Doctrine and maintains the certainty of
contract relations. The court began by noting that confining judicial
review to a literal textual analysis of adhesion form contracts is no
longer plausible: “At best, such reasoning, based on patently
unfounded assumptions of intent, is result oriented; at worst, it makes
no sense.” 105 Baldly stated, the Doctrine “is quite troublesome, since
most insureds develop a ‘reasonable expectation’ that every loss will
be covered by their policy,” but the court found suitable grounding for
the Doctrine in the conceptual work of Llewellyn and Corbin, as
reflected in Restatement § 211. 106
This treatment of insurance law is neither radical nor new.
All that is new in the “changed” Restatement is the
articulation of the rule. . . .

104

See supra note 26.

Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 393–94
(Ariz. 1984) (en banc).

105

106

Id. at 395.
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In adopting this rule, we do not create a special field of
contract law, we merely adopt a rule of integration [of the
agreement in written form] which recognizes the method by
which people do business. . . .
The rule adopted today recognizes reality and the needs of
commerce; it allows businesses that use such forms to write
their own contract. It charges the customer with knowledge
that the contract being “purchased” is or contains a form
applied to a vast number of transactions and includes terms
which are unknown (or even unknowable); it binds the
customer to such terms. However, the rule stops short of
granting the drafter of the contract license to accomplish any
result. It holds the drafter to good faith and terms which are
conscionable; it requires drafting of provisions which can be
understood if the customer does attempt to check on his
rights; it does not give effect to boilerplate terms which are
contrary to either the expressed agreement or the purpose of
the transaction as known to the contracting parties. From
the standpoint of the judicial system, the rule recognizes the
true origin of standardized contract provisions, frees the
courts from having to write a contract for the parties, and
removes the temptation to create ambiguity or invent intent
in order to reach a result. . . .
To apply the old rule and interpret such contracts according
to the imagined intent of the parties is to perpetuate a fiction
which can do no more than bring the law into ridicule. To
those troubled by the change in the law, we point out that the
fundamental change occurred first in business practice. The
change in legal analysis does no more than reflect the change
in methods of doing business. To acknowledge standardized
contracts for what they are—rules written by commercial
enterprises—and to enforce them as written, subject to those
reasonable limitations provided by law, is to recognize the
reality of the marketplace as it now exists, while imposing
just limits on business practice. These, we think, have
always been the proper functions of contract law. 107

107 Id. at 397–99. Jeff Stempel has argued persuasively that the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations has been misconstrued narrowly and should instead be regarded as a general
principle of contract interpretation that is not limited to the “strong” application of
overcoming clearly worded policy language. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations:
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Judicial protection of reasonable expectations under click-wrap
commercial contracts is simply a new iteration of the protections
formerly provided by § 2-207 and is grounded in basic principles of
contract law. 108

Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading
Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 181 (1998). Construed in this manner, the
Doctrine would naturally be viewed as a part of general contract law.
Judicial interpretation of § 2-207 has been guided by an effort to effectuate the
underlying purpose of protecting reasonable expectations of commercial parties. In its
(relatively late) “first opportunity to consider a classic ‘battle of the forms’ scenario,” the
Supreme Court of New Mexico articulated the reasonable expectations interpretation of
§ 2-207 clearly and persuasively. Gardner Zemke Co. v. Dunham Bush, Inc., 850 P.2d 319,
320 (N.M. 1993). The court endorsed the modern approach to the contract formation rules
of § 2-207, with the following explanation:

108

Discerning whether “commercial understanding” dictates the existence
of a contract requires consideration of the objective manifestations of
the parties’ understanding of the bargain. . . . The question guiding the
inquiry should be whether the offeror could reasonably believe that in
the context of the commercial setting in which the parties were acting, a
contract had been formed. This determination requires a very fact
specific inquiry. . . . Our analysis does not yield an iron clad rule
conducive to perfunctory application. However, it does remain true to
the spirit of Article 2, as it calls the trial court to consider the
commercial setting of each transaction and the reasonable expectations
and beliefs of the parties acting in that setting.
Id. at 324.
It is important to emphasize that courts must apply the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations in a manner that does not focus solely on the subjective expectations of the
complaining party. James White argued forcefully against the revisions to Article 2 that
would have adopted the “subjective” test of reasonable expectations seemingly embedded
in Article 2.20 of the UNIDROIT principles, suggesting that this would wreak havoc for
businesses. See James J. White, Form Contracts Under Revised Article 2, 75 WASH U.
L.Q. 315 (1997). White properly challenges the move from the rule of Restatement § 211(3)
that relief is available only if the party would not have agreed to the contract at all to the
UNIDROIT rule focusing on whether the party could have expected the term in question,
but in this article I propose a middle (still objective) ground. My proposal fits comfortably
within the scheme of Article 2 and reinstates the beneficial features of the § 2-207 forcefield.
Professor White offers a more telling criticism, though, because his analysis shows that the
courts in Arizona in fact adopted the subjective approach of the proposed revision to
Article 2 despite their ostensible reliance on Restatement § 211(3) as a general rule of
contract law. Any common law doctrine is subject to abuse and misapplication, and so to
this criticism, all that I can suggest is Llewellyn’s familiar belief that covert tools are
unreliable tools, and that we would be far better off for courts to develop a jurisprudence of
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The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations fits within the
conceptual structure of Article 2, as it is no more radical than the
statutory definition of “agreement,” which includes, but is not limited
to, the elements of “course of performance,” “course of dealing” and
“trade usage,” terms that clearly respect reasonable expectations and
reject a formalist approach to understanding the agreement. In the
Nanakuli case, the Ninth Circuit famously held that the price term
“posted price at time of delivery” was to be construed as a price
protection term that meant “posted price at time of delivery, but no
higher than the posted price at time of contracting,” in accordance
with the reasonable expectations of both parties generated by the
course of dealing between the parties and established trade usages. 109
reasonable expectations openly, and therefore subject to the kind of analysis and criticism
that White offers.
109 See Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1981). This
result might lead a casual observer to conclude that Article 2 pays insufficient heed to the
need for certainty and predictability in commercial transactions, but the Nanakuli court
was careful to apply the Code as written and intended: a course of dealing is established
only where the prior interactions are “fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis
of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct,” U.C.C. § 1-303(b)
(2006), and a trade usage is established only when the “regularity” of its observance is such
as to “justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in
question,” U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (2006).

It is difficult to argue that the course of dealing and trade usage should not be part of the
agreement, although one might be skeptical as to whether the factual basis for this
evidence has been established. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis
of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 715
(1999). Bernstein states that “[u]sages of trade” and “commercial standards,” as those
terms are used by the Code, may not consistently exist, even in relatively close-knit
merchant communities. While merchants in the industries examined here sometimes do
and did act in ways amounting to loose behavioral regularities, most such regularities are
either much more geographically local in nature or far more general in scope and
conditional in form than is commonly assumed. Id. But see Macaulay, supra note 37, at
788.
Bernstein's empirical findings raise questions of evidence rather than challenge the entire
approach of the U.C.C. Why isn't it enough to say that one who wants to rely on a usage
must prove it? Professor Bernstein's admirable empirical work suggests that more often
than we would have thought, a party will not be able to carry its burden of proving the
existence and content of a usage.
Macaulay notes that there certainly are trade usages that should be enforced (for example,
an order for a “2 by 4” is satisfied when the seller provides a piece of wood measuring
approximately 1 ¾” by 3 ½”), and in particular he comments on the compelling facts that
justify the result in Nanakuli as being consistent with the agreement of the parties. Id. at
794–95. See also David V. Snyder, Language and Formalities in Commercial Contracts:
A Defense of Custom and Conduct, 54 SMU L. REV. 617 (2001).
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Courts should extend the protection of “reasonable expectations” to
the electronic contracting arena where parties are no longer protected
by the force-field protections of § 2-207.
Although Article 2 embodies the principle of protecting reasonable
expectations in many of its provisions, there is no clause akin to
Restatement § 211 that would directly authorize an analysis of clickwrap contracts through this lens. Nevertheless, there is ample basis
for courts to apply the Doctrine to transactions involving the sale of
goods. 110 First, the U.C.C. “must be liberally construed and applied”
so as to “simplify, clarify, and modernize the law” and “to permit the
continued expansion of commercial practices.” 111 Inasmuch as the
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations is the best means for facilitating
the legal regulation of a new form of contracting that has outstripped
the force-field protection of § 2-207, courts are authorized to utilize
the Doctrine to guide application of the provisions of Article 2.
Second, the “principles of law and equity” relating to “validating or
invalidating” causes continue to supplement the U.C.C. unless they
have been displaced by a particular provision of the U.C.C. 112 There
simply is no sound basis to argue that the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations has been displaced by the U.C.C. The definition of
“agreement” looks to the commercial reality of the “bargain in fact”
that engenders contractual expectations. The obligation of good faith
requires both parties to observe “reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing,” 113 which amounts to the obligation to respect the other
party’s reasonable expectations in the performance and enforcement
of the contract. Moreover, Article 2 provides numerous gap filling
110 Llewellyn argued that the U.C.C. invited the enforcement of reasonable expectations
through the general tools of good faith and unconscionability, and also by providing a
model of protecting reasonable expectations in the many gap-filling provisions.
LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 369–70. There is precedent for utilizing the doctrine to clarify
troubling provisions in Article 2. John Murray cogently argues that the only reliable means
of interpreting the “part of the basis of the bargain test” under U.C.C. § 2-313 is to regard
the test as a determination of the “reasonable expectations of the buyer.” John E. Murray,
Jr., ‛Basis of the Bargain’: Transcending Classical Concepts, 66 MINN. L. REV. 283, 317–
18 (1982).
111

U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(1) and (2) (2006).

U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2006). For this reason, the U.C.C. is not a true code that displaces all
other law with respect to transactions within its scope. Comment 2 explains that
“principles of common law and equity may supplement its provisions,” but “they may not
be used to supplant its provisions, or the purposes and policies those provisions reflect.”

112

113

U.C.C. § 1-201(a)(20) (2006).
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provisions that embody rules respecting the reasonable expectations
of the parties. 114 Finally, the provisions governing the formation of a
sales agreement embrace a functionalist, rather than formalist,
conception of contracting and should not be interpreted to demand a
traditional contract analysis of click-wrap contracting. 115
One can argue that applying the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations to contracting under Article 2 is an unwarranted break
with the statutory scheme only if one unrealistically (which is to say,
without historical or textual support) reads a strict formalist approach
to contracting into Article 2. As Allen Kamp has related, Article 2 was
crafted in a functionalist time but was finalized and adopted in a
formalist period, leading to a “freedom of contract” overlay on a
“reasonable expectations” code. 116 Article 2's polysemic character
permits the judiciary to balance the values of freedom of contract and
the protection of reasonable expectations. There certainly is nothing

See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (2000) (if not otherwise agreed, the price of the goods is a
“reasonable price at time of delivery”); U.C.C. § 2-308(a) (2000) (if not otherwise agreed,
the goods are to be tendered at the seller’s place of business); and U.C.C. § 2-309 (1)
(2000) (if not otherwise agreed, the time for any action to be taken under a contract is “a
reasonable time.”). These provisions articulate what the parties would reasonably expect
in the absence of agreement (broadly defined): the goods are tendered without having to be
moved, and are sold for a reasonable price within a reasonable time.
114

A contract is formed in any manner sufficient to show “agreement” (as defined, supra
note 96 and the text accompanying note 106), and need not provide all of the necessary
terms of the agreement so long as the parties intend to be bound and “there is a reasonably
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.” Id. at § 2-204 (1), (3). Courts can
legitimately use the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in click-wrap cases to determine
what “agreement” has been shown by the parties as to specific terms, without undermining
the “agreement” that is designated in the form of a “blanket assent.” As would happen
formerly under the “knock-out” rule of § 2-207, in the absence of agreement on a particular
term, the U.C.C.’s gap-filling provisions would control.

115

116 After World War II, the collectivist, anti-laissez-faire ideals of the thirties faced the new
challenge of McCarthyism. Any admission or hint that the newly proposed commercial
code was even remotely based on collectivist theories, or that it worked against individual
bargaining, would have been disastrous. As we have seen, freedom of contract, or at least
an individual’s freedom of contract, is not a principle of the U.C.C. A merchant’s freedom
to bargain is hemmed in by “reasonableness,” the standard of good faith, the use of
standard terms and meanings and non-disclaimable usage of trade. The U.C.C., however,
could not explicitly recognize these. The U.C.C. was proposed for adoption in the fifties,
which was the worst time to mention the Code’s bias against individual bargaining.
Therefore, the U.C.C.’s explicit references to freedom of contract were added in the fifties
for political reasons. Allen R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn,
Legal Realism, and the Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALBANY L. REV. 325, 395
(1995).
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in the text, purpose, or history of Article 2 that compels courts to
adopt the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations as proposed in this
Article, but there is even more certainly nothing in the text, purpose,
or history of Article 2 to preclude courts from doing so.
James Maxeiner has argued persuasively that the contemporary
American debate about standard form contracts has ignored the rich
history that European countries, especially Germany, have developed
in this area. 117 In the postwar years, German courts utilized general
Code provisions similar to the doctrines of good faith and
unconscionability to begin systematically addressing the problem of
standardized terms. 118 Maxeiner suggests that Llewellyn found
inspiration for his theory of blanket assent in this case law, just as he
found inspiration for the unconscionability provision of the U.C.C. in
German case law from the prewar years. The German legislature
codified established case law principles in 1976; during the following
two decades the German Supreme Court decided more than 1,500
cases under the new provisions resulting in a robust jurisprudence in
this area. 119
The German code distinguishes “incorporation controls” from
“content controls.” Incorporation controls require that the terms were
available to a party at the time of contracting, and probably are
satisfied by modern click-wrap contracting. 120 Content controls are
James R. Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic Age:
European Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT’L LAW 109 (2003). Maxeiner discusses the adoption
and implementation of EU Council Directive 93/13/EEC of April 5, 1993, that was designed
to control unfair terms in consumer contracts. This EU initiative drew from the broader
German experience that was not limited to the consumer context. Maxeiner’s point is that
the Article 2 revision debacle occurred in virtually complete ignorance of these foreign
approaches and developments. He laments that the members of ALI and NCCUSL (now
known as the ULC) “would have been able to observe standard terms control systems more
extensive than section 2-302 in actual operation; they would not have had to guess whether
such a system was even possible.” Id. at 129. See also Jane K. Winn & Brian H. Bix,
Diverging Perspectives on Electronic Contracting in the U.S. and EU, 54 CLEVE. ST. L.
REV. 175 (2006) (emphasizing consumer protection afforded by EU Directives); Jennifer S.
Martin, An Emerging Worldwide Standard for Protections of Consumers in the Sale of
Goods: Did We Miss an Opportunity with Revised UCC Article 2?, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 223
(2006) (analyzing the trend in foreign law to protect consumers from strong sellers and
arguing that the amendment process for Article 2 would have benefited by drawing from
these sources).
117

118

Maxeiner, supra note 117, at 141–46.

119

Id. at 149–51.

120

Id. at 151–52, 166.
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multilayered: one provision bans certain terms, another identifies
suspect terms, and a third permits courts generally to invalidate terms
that, contrary to the principle of good faith, place either party in an
unreasonably disadvantaged position through obfuscation, by
deviating materially from baseline legal norms, or by undermining the
purpose of the contract. 121 Maxeiner argues that the statutory
provisions that evolved out of judicial interpretations of the German
Code demonstrate the feasibility of regulating standard form
agreements in a modern economy.
Functioning systems for control of unfair standard terms
exist in Europe. These systems are more ambitious than the
present-day American system.
Their very existence
challenges complacency with current American law. Their
existence undermines the two principal arguments raised to
support American law: there is no problem, and no system
could better balance the competing interests of certainty of
contract and fairness of terms. Obviously, our European
colleagues think that there is a problem, and they have taken
action to deal with it. The apparent success of the German
contract model suggests that there may not be a necessary
trade-off between control of unfair terms and predictable
contracting.
If the American system is less ambitious than its European
counterparts and is largely limited to striking down terms
that “shock the conscience,” it has not been by design. When
American legislatures enacted U.C.C. section § 2-302, they
adopted a provision that its drafters hoped would allow
American courts to develop “machinery” for “policing”
contract terms. The German Supreme Court’s development
of such machinery from essentially the same starting point
largely confirms the vision of the drafters of the U.C.C. 122

121 Id. at 152–56. Section 305(1) provides that terms “individually negotiated between the
parties” are not standard terms, and § 305(2) incorporates standard terms “only if” the
drafter “expressly draws the other party’s attention to them,” and “gives the other party . . .
the possibility of gaining knowledge of their content, and if the other party agrees that they
are to apply.” Id. at 177.
122 Id. at 171–72. Section 308 specifies clauses whose validity depends upon an evaluation
by courts, and § 309 specifies clauses that are invalid. Id. at 178–79. The general content
control provision of § 307 provides as follows:
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The German experience shows that efforts to delineate principles of
general contract law able to take into account the realities of modern
contracting are not radical efforts to be feared; rather, they are organic
developments that hold true to the conceptual structure of contract
law.
Maxeiner’s arguments in favor of a legislative solution or a
reinvigoration of unconscionability doctrine are not persuasive in the
current context, for reasons discussed above. Given the angst
surrounding the revision of Article 2, it is highly implausible at this
time that a sober and balanced legislative solution can be achieved. 123
Moreover, the doctrine of unconscionability has been cast as a
specialized consumer protection device; as such, it is unlikely to serve
as a compelling basis for dealing with commercial contracts.
However, Maxeiner’s analysis does lend strong support to my
argument that courts should develop the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations as a general feature of contract law to govern
commercial parties engaged in electronic contracting.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, as embodied in
Restatement § 211, is similar to the German regulation of standard
form agreements. Both focus on avoiding unfair surprise and the
evisceration of dickered terms. Llewellyn’s solution to the battle of the
(1) Provisions in standard terms are invalid if, contrary to the
requirement of good faith, they place the contractual partner of the user
at an unreasonable disadvantage. An unreasonable disadvantage may
also result from the fact that the provision is not clear and
comprehensible.
(2) In case of doubt, an unreasonable disadvantage is assumed if a
provision 1. can not be reconciled with essential basic principles of the
statutory rule from which it deviates, or 2. restricts essential rights or
duties resulting from the nature of the contract in such a manner that
there is a risk that the purpose of the contract will not be achieved.
Id. at 178.
Llewellyn would almost certainly argue that, in the present circumstances, courts must
take the lead by fashioning a response to the emerging contracting conditions. Any future
legislative solution should work from this judicial basis and facilitate additional creative
applications of the statutory principles to dynamic commercial settings. See supra note
84. This is the nature of Article 2: it was crafted on the basis of the wisdom generated by
judicial interpretations of the Uniform Sales Act and was drafted to ensure that courts
continued to apply the provisions with attention to context.
123
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forms famously divides the question of whether there is a contract
from a determination of the terms; as § 2-207 fades from relevance,
the policing of commercial contracts should continue to divide
questions of incorporation and control when dealing with click-wrap
contracts. In short, the lessons that comparative commercial law
might teach American judges fit well with the developing history and
guiding principles of Article 2, and are best framed by the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations.
All this having been said, and despite an expected vocal protest
that my thesis will lead to unbounded litigation, I predict that the
circumstances in which a commercial party has a viable claim that one
or more click-wrap terms should not be enforced under the Doctrine
of Reasonable Expectations will be relatively rare. This was also the
case in the battle of the forms scenario, where parties exchanged
forms and then dealt with each other with business goals in mind. As
ultimately construed and applied, § 2-207 was beneficial when the
business relationship soured and parties sought a realistic
interpretation of their bargain and a determination of their respective
duties. The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations can serve a similar
role by regulating click-wrap contracting for goods. It is time for both
the courts and commentators to recall the wisdom of Llewellyn and
others at the dawn of the widespread use of standard-form adhesion
contracts, to draw from the contemporary experiences of other highly
industrialized countries, and begin at long last to articulate the
contours of the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations.

